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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-A COMPARISON OF
WASHINGTON LAW AND THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
RICHARD COSWAY
PART 4. LL mrry OF PARTmS
Section 3401. Signature.
(1) No person is liable on an instrument unless his signature ap-
pears thereon.
(2) A signature is made by use of any name, including any trade or
assumed name, upon an instrument, or by any word or mark
used in lieu of a written signature.
Subsection (1) is a rephrasing, without substantive change, of a
former provision of the NIL.' The statutory words, "on the instru-
ment," are very significant, for there is always the possibility that
liability may exist against a non-signer on some basis other than on
the instrument itself.2 In suits on notes, the Washington rule is con-
sistent with the provisions of the Code: non-signers are not liable.3
The interrelationship between community property law and the law
of negotiable instruments may qualify this statement. If the "com-
munity" be thought of as a separate entity, that entity can be held
on notes which do not bear "its name," as on a note signed by the
husband.' Indeed, in Fies v. Storey,5 a judgment was rendered indi-
'UNIFORm NEGOTIABLE INSTRUmENTS LAW § 18 (formerly WASH. REv. CoDE §
62.01.018 (1955)) [hereinafter cited as NIL].2 See, e.g., Swenson v. Stoltz, 36 Wash. 318, 78 Pac. 999 (1904).
3Kietz v. Gold Point Mines, Inc., 5 Wn. 2d 224, 105 P.2d 71 (1940) ; Bank of Cal.
N.A. v. American Fruit Growers, Inc., 4 Wn. 2d 186, 103 P.2d 27 (1940); Nielson
v. Crossett, 3 Wn. 2d 537, 101 P.2d 351 (1940) ; Spokane Security Fin. Co. v. J. A.
Anderson Co., 177 Wash. 554, 33 P.2d 102 (1934), 10 TUL. L. REv. 146 (1935);
Security State Bank v. Adkins, 134 Wash. 94, 235 Pac. 18 (1925) ; Frazey v. Casey,
96 Wash. 422, 165 Pac. 104 (1917); First Nat'l Bank v. Conway, 87 Wash. 506, 151"
Pac. 1129 (1915).
There are two decisions, both apparently involving situations controlled by the
NIL, where § 18 ought to have been applied but was not mentioned. The cases seem
wrongly decided, unless explained on the theory of the case in the preceding note, viz.,
the liability was on an obligation apart from the note. Unhappily, some of the
language in the opinions is not consistent with this analysis. The cases are:
Vancouver Nat'l Bank v. Katz, 142 Wash. 306, 252 Pac. 934 (1927); Hanson v.
Northern Bank & Trust Co., 98 Wash. 124, 167 Pac. 97 (1917).
"Virginia Lee Homes v. Schneider & Felix Const. Co., 64 Wn. 2d 897, 395 P.2d99 (1964) ; First Nat'l Bank v. Estus, 185 Wash. 174, 52 P.2d 1243 (1936) ; Acme
Fin. Co. v. Zapffe, 161 Wash. 312, 296 Pac. 1050 (1931); Peterson v. Zimmerman,
142 Wash. 385, 253 Pac. 642 (1927) ; Stevens v. Naches State Bank, 136 Wash. 137,
238 Pac. 918 (1925); Lincoln Trust Co. v. Spangler, 121 Wash. 267, 209 Pac. 521(1922), 32 YALE L.J. 405 (1923) ; Kuhn v. Groll, 118 Wash. 285, 203 Pac. 44 (1922) ;
Way v. Lyric Theater Co., 79 Wash. 275, 140 Pac. 320 (1914) ; Lumbermen's Nat'l
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vidually against a divorced wife on a note signed only by the husband
because the underlying debt was a community obligation. One would
think that insofar as community liability is concerned, the matter ought
to be viewed as a question of what assets are reachable rather than
what persons are liable; thus, the Code's provision is not really mate-
rial to the point.6 The signer's authority to bind the community
assets will be essential if the holder of the instrument is to satisfy his
claim from those assets.' This question of authority is posed in other
areas of representation as well, of course.'
One instrument which presents something of an anomaly is the bank
money order, which appears to be an instrument drawn on a bank by
someone other than an agent of that bank. Except for the printed
designation of the bank as drawee, its name does not appear on the
instrument. Nonetheless, the best available authority suggests that
the bank is liable on the instrument."
Subsection (2) is a restatement of former NIL section 18.10 Thus,
one who signed a check "Hillyard Motors" was convicted of forgery
because he had, without authority, signed a trade or assumed name."
The Code does not change this rule.
Section 3-402. Signature in Ambiguous Capacity.
Unless the instrument clearly indicates that a signature is made
in some other capacity it is an indorsement.
This section must be read in the light of common sense and custom-
Bank v. Gross, 37 Wash. 18, 79 Pac. 470 (1905) ; Shuey v. Holmes, 20 Wash. 13, 54
Pac. 540 (1898).
'37 Wn. 2d 105, 221 P.2d 1031 (1950).
'See, e.g., Swenson v. Stoltz, 36 Wash. 318, 78 Pac. 999 (1904) ; Clark v. Eltinge,
34 Wash. 323, 75 Pac. 866 (1904) ; Clark v. Eltinge, 29 Wash. 215, 69 Pac. 736 (1902).
Thus in Balkema v. Grolimund, 92 Wash. 326, 159 Pac. 127 (1916), neither the
community nor the husband was liable on a promissory note executed by the wife on
the mere allegation that she was acting for the benefit of herself and the community,
absent authority from the husband or ratification by him. The strong presumption
is that the wife's note was hers alone. In Colagrossi v. Hendrickson, 50 Wn. 2d
266, 310 P.2d 1072 (1957), the community was held liable on a note executed by a
wife where either (a) it was within the family expense statute, WASH. REv. CODE
§26.20.010 (1958), or (b) the transaction was for a community purpose and autho-
rized or ratified by the husband. Some of the cases in note 4 supra raise factual
issues as to the extent the particular transaction was for the benefit of the community.
Normally, the signature of the husband is enough to bind the community, so if a
wife also signs a note bearing her husband's signature, she is personally liable.
Northern Bank & Trust Co. v. Graves, 79 Wash. 411, 140 Pac. 328 (1914).
'See UCC §§ 3-403, 3-404.
'Bailey, Bank Personal Money Orders as Bank Obligations, 81 BANKING L.J.
669, 676 (1964).
o WASH. REv. CODE § 62.01.018 (1955).
" State v. Morris, 38 Wn. 2d 927, 234 P.2d 478 (1951).
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ary background. Unless it is so read, there seems to be created a
conclusive presumption that every signature is an indorsement, unless
the signer positively indicates to the contrary. Thus, a signature in a
lower right hand corner of a note, not identified as that of a maker or
drawer, might be construed as an indorsement. The Official Comment
demonstrates that the drafters did not intend any such meaning-the
location of the signature is sufficient, interpreted by custom, to show
that the signer is a maker or drawer.
The Washington decisions illustrate the point that location of the
signature raises a presumption that the signer's obligation is that of
one who would normally sign in that spot. Thus, persons signing on
the back are indorsers,12 and those signing in the lower right hand
corner of the front are makers.' 3 The precise nature of the inference
to be drawn from the location of a signature is somewhat difficult to
identify. One would conclude a priori that, as against a due course
holder who did not know the background, one who signs in the maker's
traditional spot may not introduce parol to show that he was, in fact,
intended to be an indorser. That is to say, he cannot detract from
his unconditional promise to pay for use of the conditions precedent
to a secondary party's liability.14 As between the parties, however, it
ought to be possible to show that one who signed as maker had in fact
signed to accommodate the payee.'5 The payee ought not be permitted
to "bite the hand that fed him." In effect, the maker is thus permitted
to show that he signed in a capacity different from that stated on the
instrument.
Authority can be found that such a showing, at least in a suit other
than one between the accommodated and the accommodating party,
is precluded by the parol evidence rule.' The intricacies of this rule
are beyond the scope of this discussion, except to note that a different
conclusion seems possible, for the matter turns on whether the writing
is an integrated contract. One, designing to be an indorser, who signs
" Cowles v. Matthews, 179 Wash. 154, 36 P.2d 537 (1934) ; Clausen v. Forehand,
152 Wash. 310, 277 Pac. 827 (1929); Northern Bank & Trust Co. v. Graves, 79
Wash. 411, 140 Pac. 328 (1914) ; Spencer v. Alki Point Trans. Co., 53 Wash. 77,
101 Pac. 509 (1909); Wilkie v. Chandon, 1 Wash. 355, 25 Pac. 464 (1890). Some
very early cases, however, held that one who "backed" (indorsed) a note prior to its
delivery became a co-maker. Cowles v. Matthews, spra; Donohoe Kelly Banking
Co. v. Puget Sound Sav. Bank, 13 Wash. 407, 43 Pac. 359 (1896).
" Shead v. Moore, 31 Wash. 283, 71 Pac. 1010 (1903).
"Compare the liability stated under UCC §3-413(1) and. (3), with that under
§ 3-414.
' UCC § 3-415 so provides.
"Tacoma Mill Co. v. Sherwood, 11 Wash. 492, 39 Pac. 977 (1895).
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in the maker's spot can well argue that the writing does not integrate
the agreement.' Whatever the outcome on this level, the trier of fact
would be hard put to be convinced that one who signs a note in the
traditional maker's spot signed in a different capacity, so the question
may be academic.' The Official Comment makes it quite plain that
the rule of law stated in section 3-402 is not to be avoided, easily, and
states that parol evidence is admissible only for reformation. 9
Washington decisions include a case whose fate under the Code may
be uncertain. The case, Bank of California v. Starrett,"0 involved a
note on which the defendant's signature appeared in the lower left
hand corner of the face. The place usually occupied by the maker's
signature was filled, and one issue in the case was the liability of the
defendant as maker or indorser. He was held liable as maker, even
though NIL section 17 (6)21 provided: "Where a signature is so placed
upon the instrument that it is not clear in what capacity the person
making the same intended to sign, he is to be deemed an indorser ... "
The court may have reasoned that this section never became operative,
because on the facts it was clear (at least to the court) that the
defendant had signed as co-maker.22 One would predict, without
excessive conviction, that the Code would result in a contrary decision,
that the defendant is only an indorser. The reason is that, in Code
language, this signature does not clearly indicate that it was made in
a capacity other than that of indorsement. The circumstances certainly
raise doubt as to what was intended by the signatue in this unusual
"In several Washington cases parol evidence appears to have been admitted to
resolve the issue of the capacity in which a person signed. See, e.g., Northern Bank
& Trust Co. v. Graves, 79 Wash. 411, 140 Pac. 328 (1914) ; Spencer v. Alki Point
Trans. Co,, 53 Wash. 67, 101 Pac. 509 (1909); Shead v. Moore, 31 Wash. 283, 71
Pac. 1010 (1903).
S In Shead v. Moore, supra note 17, for example, three persons signed a note in
the maker's spot, as follows:
D (defendant)
X (an insolvent party)
P (plaintiff)
In a suit by P for contribution from D, alleged to be a co-maker, D's contention
(accepted by the trial court) was that he was in reality a surety only. He testified
that he had signed last, putting his signature at the top because there was no room
elsewhere. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, relying on a "common
practice for the maker of a note to affix his signature to the note first, the signature
of the surety following." Id. at 285, 71 Pac. at 1012. D failed to overcome the pre-
sumption established by the face of the note that he was a maker for consideration.
Cf. UCC § 3-414.
19 Related matters involving the parol evidence rule appear elsewhere in the code,
particularly in UCC § 3-118, 3-119, 3-403, 3-414, 3-415, 3-416 and 3-606.
"110 Wash. 231, 188 Pac. 410 (1920), 9 A.L.R. 177, 90 CENT. L.J. 394.
'WASH. REv. CODE § 62.01.017(6) (1955). See also NIL §63 [WASH. REV. CODE
§62.01.063 (1955) ].
'See BRi ro N, BILLS AND NoTEs §43 (2d ed. 1961).
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spot, but that hardly overcomes the rule of law stated in the Code. In
a decision under the Code, a Pennsylvania Common Pleas Court held
persons who had signed on the back of an instrument were makers.3
One factor in the case was similar to that being discussed, that is the
circumstance that the spot where the makers would normally sign was
filled. There were other factors, however, such as the use of a seal
(more typical of makers than indorsers), and use of plural language
in the note itself.
Section 3403. Signature by Authorized Representative.
(1) A signature may be made by an agent or other representative,
and his authority to make it may be established as in other cases
of representation. No particular form of appointment is neces-
sary to establish such authority.
(2) An authorized representative who signs his own name to an
instrument
(a) is personally obligated if the instrument neither names the
person represented nor shows that the representative signed
in a representative capacity;
(b) except as otherwise established between the immediate par-
ties, is personally obligated if the instrument names the
person represented but does not show that the representative
signed in a representative capacity, or if the instrument does
not name the person represented. but does show that the
representative signed in a representative capacity.
(3) Except as otherwise established the name of an organization
preceded or followed by the name and office of an authorized
individual is a signature made in a representative capacity.
The Code appears to have reduced to a fairly simple outline the
difficult rules governing the interrelationship between the doctrines of
the law of agency and those of negotiable instruments. Subsection (1)
retains the principle of the NIL24 and of Washington decisions2 5 that
the usual rules of agency apply to negotiable instruments and that
there are no particular formal requirements for creation of an agency
'Terkeltoub v. Caravan Motel, Inc., 3 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 494 (Pa. Common
Pleas, Lawrence Co., 1966).
2 NIL § 19 [Wash. Rev. Code § 62.01.019 (1955)].
'Sharpe Sign Co. v. Parrish, 33 Wn. 2d 883, 207 P.2d 758 (1949); Citizens
Nat'l Bank v. Ariss, 68 Wash. 448, 123 Pac. 593 (1912); Bell v. Waudly, 4 Wash.
743, 31 Pac. 18 (1892).
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to sign such paper. The phrase "or other representative" in the sub-
section, when read with the definition of the term "representative, '
26
makes the principle applicable to persons other than agents, and would
include trustees. In German-American Mercantile Bank v. Ripley,'
a stock subscription was signed by an individual, followed by the
designation "Trustee." Since the negotiable instruments provisions
of the Code do not, of course, apply to such a document, the presently
discussed subsection is not controlling. Were the instrument within
Article 3, however, a parol showing would be possible, between the
immediate parties, that the signer was in fact signing only to obligate
the trust, not to bind himself as an individual. The outcome of the
case was that the signer was personally liable, for he had not intro-
duced evidence to demonstrate that he had so signed. The result under
the Code would be the same.
Subsections (2) and (3) are designed to govern the many varieties
of factual patterns in which the form or location of a signature create
doubt whether personal liability of a signer is intended. Perhaps
because unnecessary, no rule is stated for the clearest case of the
individual's non-lability where the form spells out precisely that he
signed in a named capacity for a named principal, such as:
The A.B.C. Company,
By John Smith, Agent.
There is no doubt that if Smith (in the illustration) is authorized to
bind the A.B.C. Co., Smith is not personally liable on the instrument,
and A.B.C. Co. is liable. 8 If Smith is not so authorized, a different
Code section applies29 with different consequences.
The variations possible in the agent's signing shade from this case
to the clear-cut case at the other extreme, where the agent signs only
his name and fails to name his principal or to indicate his representa-
tive title, as a situation covered by subsection (2) (a). Thus, a signa-
ture "John Smith," to use the same agent involved in the preceding
UCC § 1-201 (35).
124 Wash. 322, 214 Pac. 160 (1923).
Braucher, UCC Article 3-Commercial Paper-New York Variations, 17 RUT-
GERS L. REv. 57, 70 (1962). That the pre-Code Washington rule is in accord, see
Washington Groc. Co. v. Citizens' Bank, 132 Wash. 244, 231 Pac. 780 (1925) (deal-
ing with a guaranty rather than a negotiable instrument).
' UCC § 3-304. For a dictum showing that the pre-code Washington rule accords
with that section, see Schwab v. Getty, 145 Wash. 66, 258 Pac. 1035 (1927), 54
A.L.R. 1382.
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illustration, binds Smith personally but does not bind A.B.C. Co., and
is not subject to modification by parol. 0
Unfortunately for the sake of clarity, the situations between these
two extremes have met with a variety of solutions in pre-Code law.
Often the only missing ingredient from the signature is the word "by"
in our first illustration. Thus, in Union Mack. & Supply Co. v. Taylor-
Morrison Logging Co.,3 the note was in this form:
Two months after date I promise to pay .... For value received, each
and every party signing or endorsing this note hereby waives present-
ment, demand, notice of non-payment and protest thereof, and binds
himself hereon as principal and not as surety, and agrees to remain
bound notwithstanding any extension which may be made to any party
liable on this note, consent being hereby given to such extensions. And
each and every party signing this note as officer or agent of a corporation
or copartnership, also binds himself individually as principal ....
(Signed) Taylor Morrison Logging Co.
J. B. Wood, Pres.
J. L. Kahaley, Sec.
The Code deals, in the section now under discussion, only with the
effect of the form of the signature; thus, under subsection (3) the
individuals are not personally liable, unless the holder is able to demon-
strate facts showing such liability. The actual decision in the case
was in accord, although the relief sought was reformation. Apparently,
admissibility of parol to show the actual circumstances and manifested
intention respecting personal liability will not be limited to reformation
suits under the Code.32
' Shuey v. Adair, 18 Wash. 188, 51 Pac. 388 (1897), 39 L.R.A. 473; Horton v.
Haley, 12 Wash. 74, 40 Pac. 624 (1895). In Barnes v. Packwood, 10 Wash. 50, 38
Pac. 857 (1894), a slight variation is presented. The note was signed by six
individuals who did not indicate a representative capacity. Its terms were: "we or
either of us promise to pay ... for the use of the Agricultural Fair Association"
The makers sought to show that the true intention was that they should be bound as
trustees for this association and not as individuals. Parol was admitted on the
theory of mistake, but nonetheless the individuals were held personally liable. It is
certainly arguable that under the Code, too, parol would be admissible because the
fair association is identified as a potential principal. This is not a case in which
there is neither a representative label annexed to the signer's name nor a principal
designated in the instrument.
143 Wash. 154, 254 Pac. 1094 (1927).
"Prior to the Code, evidence to support reformation had to be "dear and con-
vincing." Akers v. Sinclair, 36 Wn. 2d 693, 226 P.2d 225 (1951). The Code does not
seem to retain this burden. The phrasing in UCC §3-403 "except as otherwise
established" suggests a reference to "burden of establishing," in UCC § 1-201(8),
where a preponderance of the evidence seems all that is required. For difficulties of
proof under the Code, see Holohan, Commercial Transactions, 26 U. Pirr. L. REv.
265, 287 (1964).
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Only one step removed from this fact pattern is the circumstance
wherein the signer discloses a principal but fails to indicate the capac-
ity in which he signed. Way v. Lyric Theater Co.3 3 provides an
illustration, for the note in suit was signed:
Lyric Theater Company
Bert Muma
Theodore Peterson
James Anderson
G. H. Mueller.
The Washington decisions prior to the Code preclude the individuals'
showing that they were understood by the immediate parties to have
signed only in a representative capacity.34 Under the Code, subsection
(2) (b), these signers will be liable to a due course holder, but "as
between the parties," parol evidence may be used to negative personal
liability. Unlike the rule stated in subsection (3), in this circumstance
the burden of convincing the fact-finder that no personal liability was
intended rests on the signers. 5
There will often be influential facts in addition to the signature
itself. For example, the note may be in the plural "We promise to
pay," followed by signatures in the form of the Way case. Although
the Code announces a rule in the correlative situation, a signing by
In Karr v. Baumann, 3 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 180 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau County,
1966), without reformation, it was held that a note signed:
Robert Bauman, Pres.
Central Coffee Shoppee, Inc.
bound the corporation, not the individual, with the result that the defense of usury
was not available (under the New York doctrine denying this defense to a corpora-
tion). Accord, Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Ariss, 68 Wash. 448, 123 Pac. 593 (1912).
Daniel v. Glidden, 38 Wash. 556, 80 Pac. 811 (1905), is distinguishable. There a
note seems to have identified the principal and also named the representative and his
representative capacity. However, the representatives had been guilty of fraud and
that liability, of course, was personal.
2379 Wash. 275, 140 Pac. 320 (1914).
"Moore v. Webster, 191 Wash. 394, 71 P.2d 369 (1937), 82 A.L.R.2d 424, 439
(1962); Farmers State Bank v. Lamon, 132 Wash. 369, 231 Pac. 952 (1925), 42
A.L.R. 1072 (1926); Way v. Lyric Theater Co., supra note 33; Toon v. McCaw, 74
Wash. 335, 133 Pac. 469 (1913), 1915A L.R.A. 590 (1915).
'In Chips Distrib. Co. v. Smith, 226 N.Y.S.2d 488 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term, Nassau
Co., 1966), a note was signed:
E. & R. Distributing, Inc.
Rita M. Smith
17 Continental Ave.
Glen Cove, Long Island, N.Y.
The note included a clause stating that "we" authorize confession of judgment under
certain circumstances. The suit was to enforce in New York a judgment confessed in
Pennsylvania against the individual signer, Smith, personally. Under UCC § 3-403
(2) (b), parol evidence was held admissible to show that Smith signed in a represen-
tative capacity, with the result that the judgment confessed against her individually
was held void.
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more than one person of an instrument in terms "I promise to pay,"36
no rule has been found to cover the use of "We." One would conclude
that such a usage is only one of many factors to be considered in
deciding whether individual liability is intended. The "we" may be
an editorial we, thus of no significance, or in the case of a corporate
principal may be used to refer to the corporation,3 7 again of no signifi-
cance insofar as personal liability of the individuals is concerned.
Also covered by subsection (2) (b) is the circumstance in which the
signer indicates his representative capacity without naming the party
represented. An illustration is Robertson v. Club Ephrata,"' in which
a note, not naming a principal, was signed:
J. G. Dungan, President
F. R. Ahiquist, Secretary-Treasurer
The plaintiff, who was not a due course holder, sought to enforce the
note against the two individuals who had signed. Parol evidence was
admissible, said the court, to remove the ambiguity as to the personal
liability vel non of the signers. 9 The result under the Code would be
the same, although there seems to lurk a problem as to the effect of
establishing the nonliability of the signer. Is the principal liable?
Since his name does not appear on the instrument, under section
3-401 (1) it is certainly arguable that the principal is not liable. This
produces the curious consequence that neither the principal nor the
agent is liable, thus giving the payee substantially less than he had
bargained for, and producing a windfall for the principal. One would
suggest that if the parol is admissible to disclaim personal liability
of an agent or other representative, its effect must also be to create
liability on the principal's part.40 The matter does not seem free from
controversy, however.
Section 3-404. Unauthorized Signatures.
(1) Any unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative as that of the
person whose name is signed unless he ratifies it or is pre.
cluded from denying it; but it operates as the signature of the
"'UCC § 3-118(e).
'Akers v. Sinclair, 37 Wn. 2d 693, 226 P2d 225 (1951).
' 48 Wn. 2d 285, 293 P.2d 752 (1956).
'There seems to be a strong presumption, however, that the signers are per-
sonally liable. See Griffin v. Union Say. & Trust Co., 86 Wash. 605, 150 Pac. 1128(1915) (not a negotiable instrument).
' Robertson v. Club Ephrata, 48 Wn. 2d 285, 293 P.2d 752 (1956).
1968 ]
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unauthorized signer in favor of any person who in good faith
pays the instrument or takes it for value.
(2) Any unauthorized signature may be ratified for all purposes
of this Article. Such ratification does not of itself affect any
rights of the person ratifying against the actual signer.
Subsection (1) restates the rule which has been followed in Wash-
ington for some time. In 1902, for example, the supreme court had
before it a note signed "Jose & Carstens, Per Alfred Jose." It appeared
that Jose had no authority to sign for Carstens, consequently (a)
Carstens was not liable, but (b) Jose was.41 The only area of the law
relating to authority to sign instruments that may be troublesome in
Washington concerns the manner in which such authority may be
granted." This detail is beyond the scope of the Code."
There seems to have never been doubt in Washington that an unauth-
orized signature might be ratified, consistently with subdivision (2)."
No case has been found, however, extending this doctrine to a forged
signature made without any semblance of authority. Under the Code,
even such a signature may be ratified.
Section 3-405. Imposters; Signature in Name of Payee.
(1) An indorsement by any person in the name of a named payee
is effective if
(a) an impostor by use of the mails or otherwise has induced the
maker or drawer to issue the instrument to him or his con-
federate in the name of the payee; or
(b) a person signing as or on behalf of a maker or drawer intends
the payee to have no interest in the instrument; or
(c) an agent or employee of the maker or drawer has supplied
M cNamara v. Jose, 28 Wash. 461, 68 Pac. 903 (1902).
' California Stucco Co. v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 148 Wash. 341, 268 Pac. 891
(1928), 67 A.L.R. 1531 (1930), 4 WASH. L. REv. 42 (1929) ; Coleman v. Seattle Nat'l
Bank, 109 Wash. 80, 186 Pac. 275 (1919), 12 A.L.R. 108 (1921) ; Island Belt S.S. Co. v.
J. & M. Cafe, 103 Wash. 263, 174 Pac. 19 (1918).
"But see UCC § 3-403(1).
"Johnson v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., 136 Wash. 340, 239 Pac. 1018 (1925); Richards
v. Jefferson, 20 Wash. 166, 54 Pac. 1123 (1898).
UCC § 3-404 also postulates that one may be precluded from denying authority to
sign. In Bayley v. Hamburg, 106 Wash. 177, 179 Pac. 88 (1919), such preclusion was
found in somewhat unusual circumstances. It was held that since the principal had,
in fact, received the proceeds under an indorsement forged in his name, he was not
harmed and thus could not recover from the obligor on the theory that the obligor had
not been discharged by his payment to the indorsee under the forged indorsement.
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him with the name of the payee intending the latter to have
no such interest.
(2) Nothing in this section shall affect the criminal or civil liability
of the person so indorsing.
This section of the Code is differently worded from its NIL prede-
cessor, and the difference produces certain mechanical changes in
working out the "fictitious payee" and "impostor" types of cases.
The effect, however, is (with one exception to be noted hereinafter)
essentially that of the previous statute. Thus, the previous statute
was in terms of "bearer" paper, while the Code makes quite clear
the point that in neither the fictitious payee nor the impostor circum-
stance is the paper "bearer." Somebody must indorse. Since, however,
the Code does spell out that anyone can indorse, the effect is the same
as was produced under the older approach-the signature is effective
to transfer title to the paper to a subsequent holder. Whether the
person so signing is guilty of the crime of forgery is another question,
on which the Washington court has suggested that the crime may be
false pretenses rather than forgery.45
The Washington courts have recognized, in a variety of fact patterns,
that one who deals with an impostor, as by drawing a check or draft4 6
or executing a mortgage47 to the assumed name of the impostor will
bear the loss if the same person transfers the document to an innocent
purchaser. The Code has broadened this rule in that the impostor
need not be the one who actually indorses the paper. Although this
will validate signatures by accomplices, it is unlikely that any sub-
stantial change in the practical application of the controlling principle
is produced.
One Washington decision is worth specific attention. In Goodfellow
v. First National Bank,4 8 the impostor identified himself as the agent
of X stating that X was desirous of borrowing money. The plaintiff, in
order to lend the money, drew checks on the defendant bank, payable
to the order of X. The impostor indorsed X's name on the checks,
and they were paid by the drawee-defendant. While the language of
"Defiance Lumber Co. v. Bank of Cal., 180 Wash. 533, 41 P.2d 135 (1935), 99
A.L.R. 426, 10 WASH. L. R1v. 209. The Code has no provision dealing with the
criminal or civil liability of the imposter. UCC § 3-405 (2).
" Jamieson & McFarland v. Heim, 43 Wash. 153, 86 Pac. 165 (1906).
""Farmers & Mechanics Bank v. Western Loan & Bldg. Co., 103 Wash. 349, 174
Pac. 1 (1918).
"71 Wash. 554, 129 Pac. 90 (1913), 44 L.R.A. (n.s.) 580.
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the Code is somewhat obscure, the Official Comment49 suggests that
this indorsement is not effective. The Washington court likewise held
the indorsement ineffective. The reason is that the impostor at no time
identified himself as X, but as X's agent. Thus in drawing the checks
payable to X, the plaintiff-drawer did not issue the checks intending
that the impostor have title-X the principal was to have title. The
"agent" obviously could not have passed title by indorsing his own
name, and when he signed the principal's name, his signature was
ineffective. This seems altogether sound conceptually, but overly
fine-spun practically.
Subparagraph (1) (b), dealing with "fictitious payees" (without so
naming them) carries on the rule that the intention of the maker or
drawer, or one signing in his behalf, determines whether the payee's
indorsement is essential. The crux is, as was true in pre-Code law,
whether the person so drawing or making the instrument intended the
designated payee to have an interest in the paper. The typical instance
where no such intention exists is that of the dishonest agent, who
draws checks on his principal's account payable to designated payees
(who may or may not be real people) 5" knowing full well that those
designated payees are not entitled to the proceeds and intending to
cash the checks himself. Under the Code, an indorsement by such a
dishonest agent is effective; thus, if a drawee were to pay the checks,
the drawee is protected.
Washington decisions include one case, or a series of cases from the
same transaction, which produced somewhat unusual results. The
agent whose conduct caused the harm was an agent of the federal
government. He drew checks payable to named payees, intending to
cash those checks himself. He, indeed, did cash them at a bank other
than the drawee. The issue thus was, "Who bears the loss resulting
from this payment?" If the Code is applied, the loss will fall upon
the federal government, whose agent produced the loss. Since that
agent signed the checks for the government, his intention that the
named payees never receive the checks or proceeds should control, and
thus his indorsement should be effective. In fact, however, the federal
courts held to the contrary, denying the drawee bank's power to charge
the drawer's (United States) account.5' There may be some legitimate
" Last paragraph of UCC § 3-405, comment 2.
' Crosswaite v. Pierce, 56 Wn. 2d 625, 355 P.2d 160 (1960).
'United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 205 Fed. 433 (9th Cir. 1913);
United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 224 Fed. 679 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
241 U.S. 658 (1915).
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doubt whether, faced with the multitudes of fiscal agents drawing
checks for the federal government, the doctrine of the Code ought to
apply. Perhaps the federal government is entitled to protection, and
this was undoubtedly the thinking of the courts in deciding as they did.
However, there is authority to the contrary, applying the fictitious
payee rule against the government.52
Having failed to be able to charge the loss to the drawer, the drawee
bank next turned" to the bank which had "cashed" the checks for the
dishonest agent. Consistency would dictate that the drawee ought to
have been successful, for if the defendant had received payment from
the plaintiff-drawee on a check bearing a forged indorsement, that
payment would have been recoverable as money paid under mistake
of fact or, under the Code, on a theory of warranty of the presenting
bank.53 The Washington court, however, ruled against the plaintiff's
recovery,54 misrelying on a section of the negotiable instruments law.-5
The peculiar outcome in this series of cases dealing with the same
instrument seems attributable to the presence of the federal govern-
ment as drawer. Private parties involved in similar litigation must
anticipate that the loss will fall on the drawer under subsection (1) (b).
Subsection (1) (c) constitutes a change in the law, which may be
illustrated by the case of Defiance Lumber Co. v. Bank of Cal." A
dishonest foreman prepared time cards in the names of persons not
actually employed, arranged to have those cards punched to indicate
the hours of work, and submitted the cards to have pay checks drawn
in the names of these fictitious workers. The checks were, in normal
course, drawn by other representatives of the employer, payable to
the bogus employees. The checks were then taken by the foreman,
indorsed by him in the name of the payee, and cashed. Under the
concept of the NIL, this was a forged indorsement because the person
who "drew" or signed the check intended the designated payees to
have an interest. The foreman's contrary intention was not a factor
since he was not the drawer. The Code will change this, with the
consequence that the foreman's indorsement in the names of the non-
'Forged Government Checks: Misallocation of Loss by the Federal Common
Law, 75 BANKING L.J. 659, 670 (1958). The related imposter rule has frequently
been applied against the government. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of America
Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 265 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1960), 77 BANKING L.J. 223.
UCC §§ 3-417, 4-207.
" National Bank of Conmerce v. Seattle Nat'1 Bank, 109 Wash. 312, 187 Pac.
342 (1920).
'NIL § 62 [WAsir. REv. CODE § 62.01.062 (1955)]. See BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUmzNTS LAW 330 (7th ed. Beutel 1948).
'180 Wash. 533, 41 P2d 135 (1935), 99 A.L.R. 426, 10 WAsH. L. REv. 209.
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existent employees will be effective. This means that the loss will
fall on the drawer-employer, except to the extent that the foreman is
able to pay for his misdeeds. His liability, civil and criminal, is not
affected by the Code, because of subparagraph (2).
Section 3-406. Negligence Contributing to Alteration or Unau-
thorized Signature.
Any person who by his negligence substantially contributes to a
material alteration of the instrument or to the making of an unau-
thorized signature is precluded from asserting the alteration or lack
of authority against a holder in due course or against a drawee or
other payor who pays the instrument in good faith and in accord-
ance with the reasonable commercial standards of the drawee's or
payor's business.
Frequently, to prevent applying a real defense doctrine in a way
which will protect a maker or drawer who has been negligent, the
courts have utilized an estoppel or negligence argument. Illustrative
Washington cases include some in which a drawer or maker allowed
incomplete instruments to reach the hands of a dishonest employee,
who sometimes completed the instrument in an unauthorized way.
Pre-Code law normally treated this as a real defense, but Washington
courts frequently protected a drawee or even a holder because of the
drawer's negligence. 7 Since by another Code provision, section 3-115,
the defense is converted into a personal defense, the negligence analysis
is not necessary in this kind of case.
Insofar as carelessness of the maker is concerned, the altered instru-
ment cases are not significantly different: one failing to use reasonable
care in executing a note or check will be liable to a due course holder
if someone avails himself of the opportunity to change the tenor of
the paper. This result was probably not the solution reached by the
' Northern Pac. Ry. v. Spokane Valley Growers' Union, 132 Wash. 607, 232 Pac.
691 (1925), 43 A.L.R. 194 (1926), 9 MINN. L. REv. 569 (1925), 32 Case & Com. 111
(1926) ; Ladd & Tilton Bank v. Small, 126 Wash. 8, 216 Pac. 862 (1923).
Negligence has been significant in a wide variety of cases, all of them consistent
with the rule of this Code provision. See Chamberlain v. Geer, 135 Wash. 340, 237
Pac. 719 (1925) ; Lovell v. Dotson, 128 Wash. 669, 223 Pac. 1061 (1924) ; Mills v.
Hayden, 128 Wash. 67, 73, 221 Pac. 994, 997 (1924), 34 A.L.R. 1372 (1925) ("One who
executes and sets afloat negotiable paper is chargeable with a much higher degree of
diligence and caution than is chargeable to one who purchases in due and regular
course.") ; Rensselaer Valve Co. v. Union Nat'l Bank, 122 Wash. 494, 210 Pac. 947,
213 Pac. 490 (1922) ; National Bank of Commerce v. Seattle Nat'l Bank, 109 Wash.
312, 187 Pac. 342 (1920) ; Bank of Commerce v. Bingham, 30 Wash. 484, 71 Pac. 43
(1902) ; Canadian Bank of Commerce v. Bingham, 46 Wash. 657, 91 Pac. 185 (1907).
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majority of the courts prior to the Code,5" although negligence even
prior to the Code was effective to permit a drawee to charge a drawer
with the full amount of a draft which had been raised, due to the
drawer's carelessness in leaving blanks, or in some other manner
permitting alteration. 9
The Code has probably extended the effect of the negligence doctrine
in its provision dealing with negligence in facilitating an unauthorized
signature. There is a flat statement of the Washington court that,
"Negligence is no defense to an action of this character,"60 referring
to an unauthorized signature. The statement of the rule in section
3-406 contains an expression bound to be troublesome, in that the
negligence of the party will preclude asserting a lack of authority as
against a holder in due course. In some of the cases visualized by the
drafters, the unauthorized signature will be an indorsement.61 Many
words will be necessary to explain how one taking under a forged
indorsement can be a holder.6" The end sought to be reached is
desirable, but the language used is questionable.
Probably the most celebrated case in the law of negligence, insofar
as negotiable instruments law is concerned, is the Washington case,
Defiance Lumber Co. v. Bank of Cal.63 The distinction of that case
lies in the nature of the drawer's negligent acts because its entire
modus operandi was considered. This is legitimate under the Code,
too, although the typical cases will involve carelessness directly related
to the handling of the particular item involved. Illustrative are the
cases in which a check is drawn with blanks, permitting alteration, or
in pencil, or in which a check is mailed to the wrong party who has
the same name as the payee. Here the carelessness relates to the
handling of the particular item. The Defiance Lumber Co. case,
however, opens Pandora's box to an inquiry about the business acumen
and care of the drawer.
A somewhat intermediate fact pattern involves the negligence of the
drawer of a check in reconciling his accounts on the basis of returned
'See BRITroN, BILLS AND NOTES § 282 (2d ed. 1961).
lbid.
' California Stucco Co. v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 148 Wash. 341, 347, 268 Pac. 891,
893 (1928).
UCC § 3-406, comment 7.
'This has already been a source of difficulty in an Oregon decision relying on the
Code. Gresham State Bank v. 0. & K. Constr. Co., 231 Ore. 106, 370 P.2d 726 (1962),
48 IowA L. REV. 1077 (1963).
"180 Wash. 533, 41 P.2d 135 (1935), 99 A.L.R. 426, 10 WASH. L. REv. 209.
Compare Denbigh v. First Nat'l Bank, 102 Wash. 546, 174 Pac. 475 (1918), where
no negligence was shown in the hiring of an errant bookkeeper.
1968]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
paid checks. Often, the case involves merely a failure to examine the
returned vouchers, in which case section 4-406 states the applicable
rules. The drawer may sustain the loss resultant from subsequent
forgeries (or alterations) by the same dishonest handler of the check,
or even the loss caused by failure to spot the forgery or alteration of
the particular check. Not infrequently, however, the dishonest person
is an employee of the drawer. Further, this employee may be the one
charged by the employer with the task of reconciling the bank account,
with the result that the employer is never informed about his forgeries
or alterations. One could argue, on the basis of the Defiance Lumber
Co. case that the negligence of the drawer-employer is established by
his putting the "crook" in a position with too much control over the
check writing process.64 However, a recent Tennessee decision, inter-
preting the Code, did not go that far.6" There, the drawer was a
church and the loss was caused by the financial secretary who forged
necessary signatures of a co-maker. Since the cancelled checks were
mailed to the financial secretary, much time elapsed before the inroads
on the treasury of the church were discovered. The loss was allowed
to rest on drawee bank, apparently on the theory that its negligence
in (a) not detecting the forged signature and (b) not noting that all
of the checks were drawn payable to the financial secretary personally
and many were indorsed by a local race track, was more blameworthy
than the conduct of the church fathers in trusting this one who had
a previously unblemished record. Both sections 3-406 and 4-406 invite
this result, as is clearly demonstrated by subsection (3) of section
4-406.
Section 3-407. Alteration.
(1) Any alteration of an instrument is material which changes the
contract of any party thereto in any respect, including any such
change in
(a) the number or relations of the parties; or
(b) an incomplete instrument, by completing it otherwise than
as authorized; or
(c) the writing as signed, by adding to it or by removing any
part of it.
BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 372 (2d ed. 1961).
' Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 403 S.W.2d 109 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966).
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(2) As against any person other than a subsequent holder in due
course
(a) alteration by the holder which is both fraudulent and mate-
rial discharges any party whose contract is thereby changed
unless that party assents or is precluded from asserting the
defense;
(b) no other alteration discharges any party and the instrument
may be enforced according to its original tenor, or as to
incomplete instruments according to the authority given.
(3) A subsequent holder in due course may in all cases enforce the
instrument according to its original tenor, and when an incom-
plete instrument has been completed, he may enforce it as
completed.
Probably the most striking departure from the NIL's organization
is the consolidation of alteration and completion of paper. Only one
substantive change seems to result from this re-shifting, which con-
cerns the completion of paper in an incorrect but honest way. Paper
so completed and not held by a due course holder was a nullity under
the NIL.66 This gave the maker or drawer a windfall by excusing his
liability, even to the extent he had authorized its creation. The Code
eliminates this windfall: A non-fraudulent completion of paper, even
though unauthorized, will not preclude recovery to the extent that the
issuer has authorized creation of liability. This is analogized to the
alteration of complete paper which, if non-fraudulent, does not termi-
nate the issuer's liability according to the original tenor.
The conceptual distinction between honest and fraudulent alteration
is also a Code addition to previous statutory law. Some early Washing-
ton decisions can be identified as drawing the identical distinctions
utilized by the Code, namely: honest, but misguided, alterations by
a holder do not terminate liability on the instrument according to its
original tenor; and alterations made by a stranger, i.e., one not the
holder, do not discharge the original obligations. 7 Thus, an obligor
seeking to assert his discharge by virtue of an alteration of the paper
he signed must be cautious to include reference to the fraudulent
SBRiTroN, BLLS AND NoTEs 197 (2d ed. 1961).
SHendrickson v. Lyons, 121 Wash. 632, 209 Pac. 1095 (1922) (Non-negotiable
instrument, on which see 6 CoamsN, CONTRACrS § 1317 (1962)); Gould v. Gould, 99
Wash. 204, 169 Pac. 324 (1917); Lombardo v. Lombardini, 57 Wash. 352, 106 Pac.
907 (1910), 32 L.R.A. (n.s.) 515; Murray v. Peterson, 6 Wash. 418, 33 Pac. 969
(1893) ; Wolferman v. Bell, 6 Wash. 84, 23 Pac. 1017 (1893).
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nature of the change in stating his defense.68 The burden of proof
problems raised by the requirement of fraud have been discussed at
another place.69
The two preceding paragraphs have emphasized that an obligor on
a negotiable instrument may be totally discharged by some kinds of
alterations and completions or may be liable to the extent he had
originally been willing to undertake liability to others. A third possi-
bility is that the obligor may be liable to a larger or different extent
from that he had contemplated. This will be the result if he permits
incomplete paper, delivered or not, to get into circulation. Paragraph
(3) puts the risk of improper completion on the issuer, by permitting
a due course holder to recover on the instrument as completed. There
is some Washington authority consistent with this approach.7 ° In the
case of altered paper, however, a due course holder typically recovers
only according to the original tenor. The only exception will be one
in which the negligence of the issuer has facilitated the change under
the previous Code section. Of course, authorized modifications are
chargeable to the person who authorized them.7
What constitutes a material alteration is basically a question of fact,
within the guidelines set out in paragraph (1). The Washington
reports include two decisions which take a peculiar turn. In Maury
v. Winlock & Toledo Logging Ry.,72 the instrument was on its face
due August 14. It was indorsed "The correct maturity date of this
acceptance is July 28, 1925, instead of August 14, as shown on its
face." The actual holding in the case was that the drawer was not
discharged by this alteration, because he had consented. However,
there is a worrisome dictum that, absent such consent or authorization,
the signer would have been discharged. This dictum was the holding
'Mandel v. Sedrish, 3 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 526 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., King's Co., 1966).
' See the discussion of UCC § 3-307. Most difficult to deal with is Lembo v.
Federici, 62 Wn. 2d 972, 385 P.2d 312 (1963).
" Northern Pac. Ry. v. Spokane Valley Growers Union, 132 Wash. 607, 232 Pac.
691 (1925), 43 A.L.R. 194 (1925), 9 MINN. L. REv. 569 (1925), 32 Case & Com. 111(1926); Baumeister Vollmer & Scott Bank v. Talbot, 129 Wash. 509, 225 Pac. 238
(1924). See the discussion under UCC § 2-115.
" The statutory language is that a party is discharged "unless that party assents
or is precluded from asserting the defense." A party would, for example, be held to
have assented to a change made by an authorized agent. Maury v. Winlock & Toledo
Logging & Ry. Co., 148 Wash. 572, 269 Pac. 815 (1928). One might be precluded
from asserting the defense of alteration by something akin to estoppel, where he had
previously paid instruments similarly altered. Shields v. Schorno, 51 Wn. 2d 737,
321 P.2d 905 (1958). Perhaps even a failure to raise the defense at an appropriate
time will waive it. Johnson v. Owen, 184 Wash. 660, 52 P.2d 302 (1935).
" 148 Wash. 572, 269 Pac. 815 (1928).
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in an earlier case, Washington Finance Corp. v. Glass.73 There a note,
blank as to payee, had been signed by the defendant as co-maker.
The understanding was that the note would be sold to somebody as
a method of raising needed cash. The face amount of the note was
15,000 dollars, but since the sole prospective purchaser would invest
only 11,000 dollars, a fictitious payment of 4,000 dollars was indorsed
on the note and the payee's name was filled in by the firm which
advanced the 11,000 dollars.7 4 The court held that this indorsement
Was a material alteration. A wiser decision would have been to the
contrary, for alteration consists in changing the original form of the
document.75 The Code does not speak to this problem.
Manyfold more difficult and more frequently presented is the issue
whether a particular alteration is material. Most of the Washington de-
cisions seem to be clearcut.7 6 Handsaker v. Pederson7 7 on the other
hand, is not. In that case a series of notes had been executed by A, pay-
able to the defendants. The defendants had, in turn, indorsed them so
that they could be discounted. The bank which discounted the notes
would not buy them unless B's name appeared also as maker, and to
please the bank B signed as co-maker. This was done without the
knowledge or consent of the defendants, and was held to discharge
them. Under the Code, a change in the number or relations of the
parties is material only if it changes the contract of an obligor. Did
the addition of a co-maker change the contract of the indorser? The
answer is believed to be affirmative-the contract was changed, and
thus under the Code, too, the indorser is discharged. Believed to be
"74 Wash. 653, 134 Pac. 480 (1913), 46 L.R.A. (ns.) 1043.
" A brief departure from the point being developed ought to be made to call at-
tention to how the Code might apply. Assume, thus, that the change by the added
indorsement is an alteration, and we are faced with the question whether it was
fraudulent. One would believe that it is not, so the holder may proceed under UCC
§ 3-407(2) (b). But a literal reading of this subsection produces an anomalous result,
for the maker would be liable for $15,000 (the larger original sum) and not the
smaller sum advanced. Surely something other than a literal application of the sta-
tutory language is called for.
"Thus in Davis v. Gutheil, 87 Wash. 596, 152 Pac. 14 (1915), no alteration was
found in the release of a co-maker, for alteration requires a "physical change" on the
instrument by which its meaning is changed. See BRANNOx, NEGOTIABLE INsTRU-
[ENTS LAW 1203 (7th ed. Beutel 1948), stating, "The formal character of the instru-
ment [in Glass] was unchanged and the defense of alteration arises only when the form
is altered, not when a collateral matter is added, whatever may be the substantial
effect thereof."
" Hellar v. National City Co., 171 Wash. 585, 18 P.2d 480 (1933) (alteration of
numbering of bonds-now under Article 8) ; Gleason v. Brown, 129 Wash. 196, 224
Pac. 930 (1924) (no alteration shown on the evidence) ; Pitt v. Little, 58 Wash. 355,
108 Pac. 941 (1910), 23 YALE L.J. 313 (1914) (alteration of immaterial memoranda
on the note) ; Lombardo v. Lombardini, 57 Wash. 352, 106 Pac. 907 (1910) (a more
doubtful case, but one where under the Code there is no fraudulent change).
"71 Wash. 218, 128 Pac. 230 (1912).
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controlling are Code sections 3-414 (the indorser's contract), 3-507
(dishonor, which occurs on non-payment or non-acceptance at present-
ment), 3-501 (presentment), and particularly 3-504(3) (a). By the
latter section, the presentment may be made "to any one of two or
more makers." No longer is it essential that presentment be made to
all co-makers. With this understanding, it seems clear that the in-
dorser's contract was changed by addition of a co-maker, for prior to
that addition the indorser could be charged only on a presentment to
A, the first signer. Afterwards, however, a presentment to B, the sec-
ond co-maker, seems clearly enough to constitute a presentment. The
indorser did not agree to be bound on such terms! But again, what of
the requirement of fraudulent change? Probably the addition of the
co-maker was not such a modification under the circumstances; thus,
the indorser remains liable according to the original terms, i.e., on a
note signed by A. Presentment to A would establish the indorser's
liability, were A to dishonor.
Section 3-408. Consideration.
Want or failure of consideration is a defense as against any
person not having the rights of a holder in due course (Section
3-305), except that no consideration is necessary for an instrument
or obligation thereon given in payment of or as security for an
antecedent obligation of any kind. Nothing in this section shall
be taken to displace any statute outside this Act under which a
promise is enforceable notwithstanding lack or failure of con-
sideration. Partial failure of consideration is a defense pro tanto
whether or not the failure is in an ascertained or liquidated amount.
The first sentence of this Code section poses a problem in practice
and procedure, similar to that previously presented by the NIL.
Apparently, lack of consideration must be pleaded and proved by the
defendant.7'8 The most recent case on the point, however, raises doubt
whether this is literally true, for it suggests that want or failure of
consideration need not be affirmatively pleaded.79 Precise formulation
of the rule of that case is difficult, however, because it appeared that
the plaintiff had alleged consideration as an affirmative matter; thus
'As to pleading: Lee v. Swanson, 190 Wash. 580, 69 P.2d 824 (1937); Poncin
v. Furth, 15 Wash. 201, 46 Pac. 241 (1896). As to proof : West & Wheeler v. Longtin,
118 Wash. 575, 204 Pac. 183 (1922); State Bank v. Morrison, 85 Wash. 182, 147
Pac. 875 (1915); McKenzie & Gibbons v. Oregon Improvement Co., 5 Wash. 409,
31 Pac. 748 (1892). See also UCC § 3-307.
" Mell v. Winslow, 49 Wn. 2d 738, 306 P.2d 751 (1957).
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a general denial was held to present the appropriate issue. Some of
the earlier cases seem hyper-technical in their pleading refinements.
For example, it has been held that an illegal consideration cannot be
shown under an allegation of no consideration.8" The Code does not
resolve this issue, although it does clearly suggest that, even as between
the original parties to a note, consideration is presumed, as was true
under the negotiable instruments law.8
The second portion of the first sentence, following the "except,"
will clarify, if not change, Washington law. Many are the instances
when a person will sign or indorse a note evidencing a prior debt on
which the signer was not personally bound. Earlier decisions have held
the signer liable if consideration could be found, and the typical
finding was that an extension of time was such,8" or that forbearance
from suit was enough, 83 or that the actual signing of the instrument
implemented a prior understanding committing the signer and sup-
ported by consideration.84 The Code's statement is more forthright,
somewhat in line with an earlier Washington decision.85 To be observed
is the warning that the antecedent obligation referred to need not be
the obligation of the signer! In the Washington cases, where one
person signed a note for which the consideration passed to another, the
court has usually found some justification in imposing liability on the
signer because of some actual or presumed interest he had in the
welfare of the primary debtor.86 While this concern will usually be
- Lyts v. Keevey, 5 Wash. 606, 32 Pac. 534 (1893). But see, Barbre v. Hibschman,
77 Wash. 563, 137 Pac. 997 (1914) (finding of fact that a note was executed upon
"a valuable consideration" is not objectionable as too general).
'Ginett v. Greene, 87 Wash. 40, 151 Pac. 99 (1915); McKinley v. Miner Hill
Consol. Mining Co., 46 Wash. 162, 89 Pac. 495 (1907); Baker-Boyer Nat'l Bank v.
Hughson, 5 Wash. 100, 31 Pac. 423 (1892).
' Shrive v. Crabtree, 149 Wash. 500, 271"Pac. 329, modified, 274 Pac. 712 (1928);
Knickerbocker Co. v. Hawkins, 102 Wash. 582, 173 Pac. 628 (1918); Hobson v.
Marsh, 69 Wash. 326, 124 Pac. 912 (1912); Pitt v. Little, 58 Wash. 355, 108 Pac.
941 (1910), 23 YALE L.J. 313 (1914). See Comment, Consideration it Suretyship
Contracts in Washington, 31 WAsH. L. REv. 76, 81 (1956).
'Shields v. Schorno, 51 Wn. 2d 737, 231 P.2d 905 (1958); Johnson v. S. L.
Savidge, Inc., 43 Wn. 2d 273, 260 P.2d 1088 (1953) ; Dittmar v. Frye, 200 Wash. 451,
93 P.2d 709 (1939); McHugh v. Rosala, 184 Wash. 463, 51 P.2d 616 (1935);
Nicholson v. Neary, 77 Wash. 294, 137 Pac. 492 (1914) (claim must be well
founded); Galena Natl Bank v. Ripley, 55 Wash. 615, 104 Pac. 807 (1909), 26
L.RtA. (n.s.) 993.
" Dittmar v. Frye, 200 Wash. 451, 93 P.2d 709 (1939).
'Wilkie v. Chandon, 1 Wash. 355, 25 Pac. 464 (1890).
'First Nat'l Bank v. Estus, 185 Wash. 174, 52 P.2d 1243 (1936); Mallette v.
Pohlman Inv. Co., 179 Wash. 654, 38 P.2d 357 (1934); Moore v. Kildall, 111 Wash.
504, 191 Pac. 394 (1920); Flanagan v. American Minerals Prod. Co., 108 Wash.
569, 185 Pac. 609 (1919) ; Skagit State Bank v. Moody, 86 Wash. 286, 150 Pac. 425(1915), 1916A L.R.A. 1215; Lumbermen's Nat'l Bank v. Ellis H. Gross Co., 37 Wash.
18, 79 Pac. 470 (1905).
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present, or the signer would not have become involved, concern for
the debtor is not an essential under the Code.
There is nothing new in the provision that total want or failure of
consideration is a defense to liability, as between the parties,87 or that
partial failure is a defense pro tanto.81 But there is a significance in the
language that the failure need not be demonstrably of a liquidated
amount.89
Need it be said that only man's imagination limits those things which
may serve as consideration for a promise? A note may be given in
exchange for a cross note9" or to soothe a cross woman 9' and be
supported by consideration. Bonus notes92 and bogus notes9 3 have
been found to be consideration. Other forms of consideration are
' Eder v. Nelson, 41 Wn. 2d 58, 246 P.2d 230 (1952) ; Knowlton v. Walker Timber
Co., 170 Wash. 436, 16 P.2d 815 (1932) ; Cummings v. Wilk, 150 Wash. 512, 273 Pac.
527 (1929) ; American Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Peterson, 112 Wash. 101, 191 Pac.
837 (1920) (no want or failure of consideration shown); Hornburg v. Larson, 93
Wash. 74, 160 Pac. 11 (1916) ; Preas v. Vollintine, 53 Wash. 137, 101 Pac. 706 (1909) ;
Gross v. Bennington, 52 Wash. 417, 100 Pac. 846 (1909) ; Hardin v. Sweeney, 14
Wash. 129, 44 Pac. 138 (1896) (no want or failure of consideration shown) ; Walsh
v. Cooper, 10 Wash. 513, 39 Pac. 127 (1895). The decision in J. M. Arthur & Co.
v. Blackman, 63 Fed. 536 (N.D. Wash. 1894) would not be expected under the Code,
for the outcome seems to have been predicated on the assumption that destruction of
goods in the hands of a conditional buyer amounts to a failure of consideration.
This, in turn, seems to rest on the archaic Washington rule that risk of loss in such
instances is on the conditional seller. While the Code is surprisingly unclear on the
point, the assumption seems to be justified that the buyer will bear the risk in such
instances under UCC § 9-207 (which is really not applicable, for the buyer is in
possession), and UCC § 2-509.
In Pacific Northwest Inv. Soc'y v. Cunningham, 54 Wash. 284, 103 Pac. 9 (1909), a
note was given in payment of an installment for a bond. The note provided, "In case
this note is not paid at maturity the said Bond ... shall be void and of no effect."
The note's maker contended there was no consideration, for on non-payment the note
'became void and consideration failed. This argument was rejected.
' See Hamilton v. Ramage, 89 Wash. 649, 155 Pac. 151 (1916); Christie v.
Gmeiner, 62 Wn. 2d 808, 384 P.2d 812 (1963).
' This language also appeared in the NIL. An instrument may be given in ex-
change for several considerations, only some of which fail. Clearly, the doctrine of
partial failure of consideration will apply. See Burton v. Dunn, 55 Wn. 2d 368, 347
P.2d 1065 (1960) ; Hamilton v. Ramage, supra note 88; Bay View Brewing Co. v.
Tecklenberg, 19 Wash. 469, 53 Pac. 724 (1898). There are other cases, however, in
which a single consideration will fail to meet the expectations of the issuer of a
negotiable instrument. Is this diminution in value a "partial failure of considera-
tion?" In Washington, an affirmative answer seems to be expectable, for there is
pre-Code authority pointing in that direction. See Gunderson v. Green, 154 Wash.
201, 281 Pac. 731 (1929); Hamilton v. Mihills, 92 Wash. 675, 159 Pac. 887 (1916).
There is, in short, no requirement that the "partial failure of consideration" consist
in the failure of a severable portion of the consideration. The Gunderson decision,
supra, seems to suggest that this sort of partial failure will be recognized only on
a showing of fraud or in a deal involving a confidential relationship.
'Acme Fin. Co. v. Zapffe, 161 Wash. 312, 296 Pac. 1050 (1931).
91 Opitz v. Hayden, 17 Wn. 2d 347, 135 P.2d 819 (1943).
92 Steeple v. Max Kuner Co., 121 Wash. 47, 208 Pac. 44 (1922).
'Whitman Realty & Inv. Co. v. Day, 161 Wash. 72, 296 Pac. 171 (1931) ; Moore
v. Kildall, 111 Wash. 504, 191 Pac. 394 (1920) ; McConaughy v. Juvenal, 73 Wash.
166, 131 Pac. 851 (1913).
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indicated in the footnote. 4 Two further observations remain: (1)
If a particular signer of an instrument has received consideration for
his obligation, he will be liable even though someone else may not have
received consideration for signing;95 (2) If the instrument reaches a
due course holder, the defenses of want or failure of consideration
disappear. 6
Section 3-409. Draft not an Assignment.
(1) A check or other draft does not of itself operate as an assign-
ment of any funds in the hands of the drawee available for
its payment, and the drawee is not liable on the instrument
until he accepts it.
(2) Nothing in this section shall affect any liability in contract,
tort or otherwise arising from any letter of credit or other
obligation or representation which is not an acceptance.
Subsection (1) really states two rules: (1) a check or draft is not
an assignment; and (2) the drawee is not liable on the instrument
until acceptance or certification. The second rule is merely an off-
shoot of the rule stated in section 3-401 that no person is liable on
an instrument unless his signature appears thereon. 7
The Washington Court has often recognized the doctrine that a check
or draft is not an assignment.9" In only one instance, Phinney v.
Sanders v. General Petroleum Corp. 171 Wash. 250, 17 P2d 890 (1933) (gaso-
line station); Goodsell v. Phillips, 130 Wash. 120, 227 Pac. 13 (1924) (accommoda-
tion party, see UCC § 3-415) ; Lincoln Trust Co. v. Spangler, 121 Wash. 267, 209
Pac. 521 (1922), 32 YAL.z L.J. 405 (credit to third person) ; National Fin. Co. v.
Emerson, 117 Wash. 297, 201 Pac. 4 (1921) (phonographs destroyed before the buyer
(maker of the notes) received them-risk of loss on buyer however); Owen v.
Bausman, 105 Wash. 412, 177 Pac. 792 (1919) (attorney's fees) ; Harris v. Johnson,
75 Wash. 291, 134 Pac. 1048 (1913) (possessory rights to real estate); Aurora
Land Co. v. Keevan, 67 Wash. 305, 121 Pac. 469 (1912) (loan of money).
' Allen v. Chambers, 13 Wash. 327, 43 Pac. 57 (1895).
Jamieson & McFarland v. Heim, 43 Wash. 153, 86 Pac. 165 (1906).
Steele v. Hellar, 127 Wash. 140, 219 Pac. 879 (1923); Anderson v. National
Bank, 146 Wash. 520, 264 Pac. 8 (1928) ; Nelson v. Nelson Bennett Co., 31 Wash. 116,
71 Pac. 749 (1903). There once was a provision for "virtual" acceptance by a
promise to accept, as was abortively sought to be used in Citizens Bank v. Willing,
109 Wash. 464, 186 Pac. 1072 (1920). The Code does not provide for such acceptances.
See UCC § 3-410, comment 3. There is some doubt whether the rule announced in the
Code as to non-liability of a drawee applied to non-negotiable instruments. See
Bleitz v. Bryant Lumber Co., 110 Wash. 437, 188 Pac. 509 (1920), aflirmance upheld oi
rehearing per curiam, 113 Wash. 455, 194 Pac. 550 (1920). Because of UCC § 2-805,
the same rule is applied to any instrument if it lacks negotiability only because of
the omission of the words "order" or "bearer.'
' Stern v. Lone, 32 Wn. 2d 785, 203 P.2d 1074 (1949) (thus a preference was made
on payment) ; Whorf v. Seattle Nat'l Bank, 173 Wash. 629, 24 P.2d 120 (1933) ;
National Mkt. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 100 Wash. 370, 170 Pac. 1009, 174 Pac. 479
(1918), 1 A.L.R. 450 (1919) ; Sheets v. Coast Coal Co., 74 Wash. 327, 133 Pac. 433
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State,0 9 was temptation to protect a holder too great. There, a check
was drawn on the drawer's deathbed, payable to a lifelong friend. The
drawee refused to honor the check on presentment after the drawer's
death. The parties to the dispute were the lifelong friend and the
state, claiming escheat. Is there really any substantial doubt that the
state will lose again, even under the Code, though there is clearly no
statutory warrant for such a recovery?
The drawee's liability may be found to exist quite apart from the
draft itself. For example, a third party beneficiary contract may exist,
in which the payee of a draft is the beneficiary and the promisor is the
drawee. Such third party beneficiary contracts are enforceable by
the beneficiary.' 0 Perhaps analogously, a drawee bank may, on occa-
sion, be held on the theory that it has accepted a "special deposit,"
to be used only for the advantage of a particular party.' The Code
does not abolish such liability above and beyond the instrument
itself. The statute's provision that a check or draft is not an assign-
ment does not, or ought not, preclude an actual express assignment of
a claim. The Washington court has failed to find an assignment in
situations which are, at least, highly doubtful. 2
Section 3410. Definition and Operation of Acceptance.
(1) Acceptance is the drawee's signed engagement to honor the
draft as presented. It must be written on the draft, and may
consist of his signature alone. It becomes operative when
completed by delivery or notification.
(2) A draft may be accepted although it has not been signed by
(1913) ; Frederick & Nelson v. Spokane Grain Co., 47 Wash. 85, 91 Pac. 570 (1907) ;
Wadhams v. Portland, V. & Y. Ry., 37 Wash. 86, 79 Pac. 597 (1905); Commercial
Bank v. Chilberg, 14 Wash. 247, 44 Pac. 264 (1896).
' 36 Wash. 236, 78 Pac. 927 (1904).
"Kelley & Brodock v. Greenough, 9 Wash. 659, 38 Pac. 158 (1894).
"' Big W. Oil Co. v. Moody, 179 Wash. 95, 35 P.2d 1093 (1934) ; Laing v. First
Nat'l Bank, 138 Wash. 227, 244 Pac. 679 (1926) ; Collins v. Johnson, 136 Wash. 256,
239 Pac. 393 (1925) ; Pacific Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 127
Wash. 524, 221 Pac. 313 (1923); Beehive Marketeria v. Citizens Bank, 126 Wash.
526, 218 Pac. 237 (1923) ; Washington Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Duke, 126 Wash. 510, 218
Pac. 232 (1923), 37 A.L.R. 611 (1925); Raynor v. Scandinavian-American Bank,
122 Wash. 150, 210 Pac. 499 (1922), 25 A.L.R. 716; Central Bank & Trust Co. v.
Ritchie, 120 Wash. 160, 206 Pac. 926 (1922); Spiroplos v. Scandinavian-American
Bank, 116 Wash. 491, 199 Pac. 997 (1921), 16 A.L.R. 181 (1922) ; Hitt Fireworks
Co. v. Scandinavian Am. Bank, 114 Wash. 167, 195 Pac. 13, 196 Pac. 629 (1921);
Stephens v. Chehalis Nat'l Bank, 80 Wash. 254, 141 Pac. 340 (1914) ; Taggart v.
First Nat'l Bank, 12 Wash. 538, 41 Pac. 892 (1895).
.
2
.Compare RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 163 (1932), with Wadhams v. Portland
V. & Y. Ry., 37 Wash. 86, 79 Pac. 597 (1905), and Nelson v. Nelson Bennett Co., 31
Wash. 116, 71 Pac. 749 (1903).
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the drawer or is otherwise incomplete or is overdue or has been
dishonored.
(3) Where the draft is payable at a fixed period after sight and
the acceptor fails to date his acceptance the holder may com-
plete it by supplying a date in good faith.
Pre-Code law required that an acceptance be in writing'"° but did
not require, as does the Code, that it be written on the instrument.
As a consequence, there are a few early decisions trying to identify
the rudiments of a written acceptance.' 04 Those decisions will have
no role under the Code; the acceptance must be on the instrument
itself.
In one or two instances, payees of instruments have sought to bind
a drawee who had not accepted, using some conduct on the drawee's
part as a device to estop the drawee from disclaiming liability. One
attempt which properly failed is Seattle Shoe Co. v. Packard,05 in
which the drawee had paid several previous drafts and because of this
was sought to be held on a draft subsequently presented but not
accepted. All of us who have checking accounts will realize at once
that acceptance of past drafts or checks does not establish a course
of conduct dictating that subsequent checks and drafts be paid or
accepted. Since the relationship between the drawee and drawer which
authorizes drafts is a fluid one, what the drawee might be willing to
do today does not speak to what he may do tomorrow.
Also somewhat troublesome has been the predicament of a bank
which pays a check bearing a forged indorsement. It has been argued
that such payment is an acceptance, for it shows the willingness of the
drawee to accede to the order. The decisions have properly been
contrary.0 0 Acceptance is forward looking, designed to create an
obligation to pay; payment, on the other hand, is designed to terminate
-an obligation to pay. The Code treats these matters somewhat differ-
ently. Although payment under a forged indorsement is not acceptance
or certification, the drawee has converted the instrument under section
3-419(1) (c). Since the measure of the drawee's liability is the face
" Sheets v. Coast Coal Co., 74 Wash. 327, 133 Pac. 433 (1913); Vadhams v.
Portland V. & Y. Ry., supra note 102; Seattle Shoe Co. v. Packard, 43 Wash. 527, 86
Pac. 845 (1906).
I" Citizens Bank v. Willing, 109 Wash. 464, 186 Pac. 1072 (1920) ; Plaza Farm-
ers' Union Warehouse & Elevator Co. v. Ryan, 78 Wash. 124, 138 Pac. 651 (1914).
" 43 Wash. 527, 86 Pac. 845 (1906).
"Whorf v. Seattle Nat'l Bank, 163 Wash. 629, 24 P.2d 120 (1933); Anderson
v. National Bank, 146 Wash. 520, 264 Pac. 8 (1928).
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amount of the instrument, the end result is as if the drawee had
certified the check.
Section 3-411. Certification of a Check.
(1) Certification of a check is acceptance. Where a holder pro-
cures certification the drawer and all prior endorsers are dis-
charged.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed a bank has no obligation to certify a
check.
(3) A bank' may certify a check before returning it for lack of
proper indorsement. If it does so the drawer is discharged.
There have been but few cases in Washington involving the liability
of a certifying bank. The supreme court has had occasion to define
a certified check and to compare it with other kinds of documents,'017
but there is nothing in that decision material to the provisions of this
section of the Code. The decision does refer obliquely to the question
whether payment may be stopped on a certified check, and the Code
seems to suggest that it may not.'0 8 Such protestations are analogous
to the jail inmate who shouts, "You can't put me in here." Both will
take a law suit to find out.
One decision spells out the liability of a bank which certifies a
check drawn against insufficient funds, stating: "It has been repeat-
edly held that a bank certifying a check without funds is not liable
thereon, except to a bonafide holder for value."'0 9 This is in essence
the rule announced by the Code in section 3-418. A separate statute
makes such a certification a gross misdemeanor and further provides:
"Any such check so certified by a duly authorized person shall be a
good and valid obligation of the bank or trust company in the hands
of an innocent holder."' The words "innocent holder" in that statute
probably must be equated to "holder in due course."
Section 3-412. Acceptance Varying Draft.
(1) Where the drawee's proffered acceptance in any manner varies
the draft as presented the holder may refuse the acceptance
and treat the draft as dishonored in which case the drawee is
entitled to have his acceptance cancelled.
'Kohler v. First Nat'l Bank, 157 Wash. 417, 289 Pac. 47 (1930).
UCC §§ 4-303, -403.
"National City Bank v. Titlow, 233 Fed. 838, 841 (W.D. Wash. 1916).
"'WASH. REv. CODE § 30.16.010 (1961).
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(2) The terms of the draft are not varied by an acceptance to pay
at any particular bank or place in the United States, unless
the acceptance states that the draft is to be paid only at such
bank or place.
(3) Where the holder assents to an acceptance varying the terms
of the draft each drawer and indorser who does not affirma-
tively assent is discharged.
Although there have been cases in Washington in which conditional
acceptances have been taken by the holder of an instrument, no deci-
sion has been discovered respecting the effect thereof on the liability
of parties. In Schwabacher Hardware Co. v. Miller Sawmill Co.,"'
the drawee accepted a draft "payable out of proceeds of N.W.Fisheries
Co. contract when same becomes available." Under the Code, the
holder would have the option to refuse this acceptance, and if he
accepted it, the drawer and indorsers would be discharged. The actual
outcome of the case, that the drawee was liable to the holder and
was not permitted to apply such proceeds to a debt due it, would not
be modified by the Code.
The Code, likewise, does not deal specifically with the problem
raised in Taylor v. Parish,"2 where an acceptance was ambiguous.
Parol evidence was admitted to clarify and remove the ambiguity.
There is no reason to foresee a different decision from that reached.1 13
Sometimes the language used will not import an assent to be bound on
any terms, in which case there is no acceptance 4 and the instrument is
dishonored."5
Subparagraph (2) rephrases NIL section 140116 which does not
seem to have been involved in litigation. Apparently trade acceptances
are frequently so written as to permit this kind of acceptance, and the
Code makes specific incorporation of such language unnecessary."
Section 3-413. Contract of Maker, Drawer and Acceptor.
(1) The maker or acceptor engages that he will pay the instrument
according to its tenor at the time of his engagement or as
n'90 Wash. 193, 155 Pac. 767 (1916).
u186 Wash. 141, 149 Pac. 635 (1915).
" See UCC § 3-119, comment 1.
u'Plaza Farmers' Union Warehouse & Elevator Co. v. Ryan, 78 Wash. 124, 138
Pac. 651 (1914).
' UCC § 3-507(1) (a).
" WAsH. Ray. CoDE § 62.01.140 (1955).
117 See I PATON'S DIGEST 6, 44 (1940).
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completed pursuant to Section 3-115 on incomplete instru-
ments.
(2) The drawer engages that upon dishonor of the draft and any
necessary notice of dishonor or protest he will pay the amount
of the draft to the holder or to any indorser who takes it up.
The drawer may disclaim this liability by drawing without
recourse.
(3) By making, drawing or accepting the party admits as against
all subsequent parties including the drawee the existence of
the payee and his then capacity to indorse.
Subsection (1) states succinctly the liability of primary parties to
negotiable instruments. There are no stated conditions precedent to
the liability of the maker and acceptor, in contrast to the situation of
the drawer and, in a later section, of the indorser."' In at least one
situation, however, presentment to one other than a maker or acceptor
is a condition precedent to his liability: the case of a note or accept-
ance payable at a bank. The Code specifically requires presentment
to the bank and, under certain circumstances, sanctions this by dis-
charge of the maker or acceptor." 9 Washington numbers among its
decisions the case of Bardsley v. Washington Mill Co., 120 in which the
note in controversy called for payment "at Spokane, Washington."
An installment of interest was not paid, and the holder, without pre-
senting the instrument in Spokane, brought suit, relying on an acceler-
ation clause. In holding the suit to be premature, the court relied
upon the "general law" rather than the NIL,' 2 ' concluding that the
instrument was payable at the place of business (in Spokane) of the
maker. The holder's failure to give the maker an opportunity to pay
there precluded acceleration. Although this decision has been criti-
cized,"22 there is no reason to foresee a different result under the
Code. -1 2 1
118UCC § 3-414.
"gUCC § 3-501 (1) (c). There would be no departure from the decision reached in
Paolella v. Brunner, 116 Wash. 677, 200 Pac. 481 (1921), for unless the bank at which
the instrument is domiciled fails, the drawer, maker or acceptor is not discharged.
" 54 Wash. 553, 103 Pac. 822 (1909).
"NIL § 70 [WASH. REv. CODE § 62.01.070 (1955)] stated: "But if the instrument
is by its terms, payable at a special place, and he is able and willing to pay it there
at maturity, such ability and willingness are equivalent to a tender of payment upon
his part." The Court did not feel that the reference to "Spokane, Washington"
designated a "special place" within the meaning of this language.
" Harrison v. Beals, 111 Ore. 563, 22 Pac. 728, 732 (1924).
" UCC § 3-604(3), in covering the point, eliminates the word "special." One has
difficulty, however, in adapting the language of that section to the specific case, for
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Because the maker's liability is primary, the mere circumstance that
the holder is in possession of funds belonging to a co-maker does not
require the holder to set-off these funds. He may proceed against the
maker without first using such assets.'24 It would seem that one who
holds a note merely as collateral may, in the same fashion, enforce the
maker's liability on that note without the necessity of proceeding on
the principal indebtedness.2 5
The obligation of a maker or acceptor may be curtailed or even
eliminated. For example, an acceptance made payable out of money
due on a building contract creates no liability if there is no money
thus due.'26 Similarly, a note which provides that in case suit is started
the payee will look solely to the mortgaged property given to secure
the note, and that no deficiency will be entered against the maker,
will not support an action to enforce personal liability of the maker
for principal or interest.127 The Code expressly provides, in similar
vein, that a drawer may eliminate recourse against himself. 2 8
The drawer's liability has also been held to be eliminated, at least
vis-A-vis the drawee, by an appropriate reference to the background
of the instrument, showing it to have been drawn under a letter of
credit."'29 The Code covers this point in another section.130 In most
circumstances, however, the drawer's liability is a secondary one re-
quiring, as the Code suggests, compliance with certain conditions pre-
cedent to liability."'
Subsection (3) carries forward a provision of the NIL'32 which
has been a source of trouble to the Washington court. Observation
of the wording of the section demonstrates that the drawer admits the
existence of the payee and his capacity to indorse. This means that
one must be doubtful how the maker would proceed to show he was ready and able to
pay "at every place of payment specified."
" Bank of Cal. v. Starrett, 110 Wash. 231, 188 Pac. 410 (1920), 9 A.L.R. 177, 90
CENT. L.J. 394.
' Scandinavian Am. Bank v. Appleton, 63 Wash. 203, 115 Pac. 109 (1911).
Brinker v. Peoples Say. Bank, 144 Wash. 93, 256 Pac. 1025 (1927). Cf.
Schwabacher Hardware Co. v. Miller Sawmill Co., 90 Wash. 193, 155 Pac. 767(1916), where the condition of the acceptance was in fact met. See also UCC § 3-412.
_- Saulsberry v. Wood, 180 Wash. 340, 39 P.2d 592 (1935).
UCC § 3-413 (2).
'Bank of East Asia, Ltd. v. Pana, 140 Wash. 603, 249 Pac. 1060 (1926), 2
WAs H. L. Ry. 130 (1927).
UCC § 5-111.
"Fick v. Jones, 185 Wash. 365, 55 P.2d 334 (1936) ; Spiroplos v. Scandinavian-
American Bank, 116 Wash. 491, 199 Pac. 997 (1921), 16 A.L.R. 181. This latter
decision has been questioned, although not on the point here involved, in Raynor v.
Scandinavian-American Bank, 122 Wash. 150, 210 Pac. 499 (1922), 25 A.L.R. 716(1923).
'NIL § 62 [WAsH. REv. CoDE § 62.01.062 (1955)].
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as to a holder claiming under the indorsement of the payee, the maker
is not permitted to gainsay the effectiveness of the indorsement made
by the payee. 33 However, it does not mean that the drawer, maker
or acceptor also admits that the payee did in fact indorse. A decision
with dictum to the contrary on this point ought not be followed.'
Section 3-414. Contract of Indorser; Order of Liability.
(1) Unless the indorsement otherwise specifies (as by such words
as "without recourse") every indorser engages that upon dis-
honor and any necessary notice of dishonor and protest he will
pay the instrument according to its tenor at the time of his
indorsement to the holder or to any subsequent indorser who
takes it up, even though the indorser who takes it up was not
obligated to do so.
(2) Unless they otherwise agree indorsers are liable to one another
in the order in which they indorse, which is presumed to be the
order in which their signatures appear on the instrument.
An indorser's liability is of two kinds: (1) his contract to pay the
instrument; and (2) his warranties about the instrument. The second
form of liability is stated in another section of the Code- '3' In the
presently discussed section is stated the contractual liability of the
indorser-he must pay according to the tenor of the instrument at
the time he indorsed. Thus, an indorser of a note promising payment
of attorney's fees may be held liable for such fees.136 This liability,
however, is conditional on dishonor, notice and, in some instances,
protest. Failure to comply with those conditions discharges his liability
completely.3 7  Compliance with those conditions, however, permits
the holder or any subsequent indorser who has paid 3 to bring a
" Castor v. Peterson, 2 Wash. 204, 26 Pac. 223 (1891).
... National Bank of Commerce v. Seattle Nat'l Bank, 109 Wash. 312, 187 Pac.342 (1920). See BRANNON, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 330 (7th ed. Beutel
1948).SUCC § 3-417(2). Observe that the warranty liability is predicated on the act
of transfer, not the act of indorsing. Thus an accommodation indorser who does not
transfer makes no warranties.
"Paragon Buying Serv., Inc. v. Sylbay Trealty Co., 3 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 67(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
' UCC § 3-501. Accord, Clausen v. Forehand, 152 Wash. 310, 277 Pac. 827 (1929);
Galbraith v. Shepard, 43 Wash. 698, 86 Pac. 1113 (1906).
"SDownie v. Cooledge, 48 Wn. 2d 485, 294 P.2d 926 (1956). The Code's rule is
more extensive than that announced in Downie, for there the indorser, plaintiff, who
was entitled to recover from a prior indorser, had in fact endorsed with recourse.
Under the Code, he could recover even though his indorsement was without recourse.
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successful action against the indorser alone139 or with the maker.140
There is no power granted to an indorser, similar to that of a surety,
to require suit first against the principal obligor.1 4 1
The appropriate way to obviate this liability is to indorse "without
recourse," placing these words prior to the signature. If the words
appear below the signature, a parol evidence rule problem arises, for
evidence will be necessary to relate the disclaimer to the signature.
There is no definite Washington decision on this point.14 2 There are
decisions, however, on other aspects of the parol evidence rule, but
their lack of agreement is disappointing. All too frequently an indorser
will be induced to sign by oral assurances that he will not be held
liable. Bolstered by such assurances, he will sign his name without
bothering to limit his liability by use of "without recourse." The
emotional pulls are pretty strong in such cases, but the Official Com-
ment is hard-hearted: the disclaimer may not be shown by parol.'4 3
The decisional law in Washington is ample to support almost anything
a judge decides to do. He may exclude the evidence,144 or admit it
generally,'46 or for the limited function of establishing lack of consider-
ation or fraud.' 46 There is even a hint of another possible attack:
admit the evidence for purposes of reformation, but not otherwise. 147
One would suppose that the Official Comment's strong language would
be rather persuasive in this state of the decisional law. On the other
hand, the Code itself permits use of parol to show the order in which
persons signed. This is consistent with pre-code decisional law, 4 ' yet
somewhat difficult to reconcile with the previously firm adherence to
the parol evidence rule's exclusionary effect.
Pre-Code Washington decisions are to the clear effect that one who
"indorses" a non-negotiable instrument is not liable as indorser but
only as assignor.' 49 These decisions are not valid if the only reason
' Petri v. Manny, 99 Wash. 601, 170 Pac. 127 (1918), 1 A.L.R. 1595; Ginnett v.
Greene, 87 Wash. 40, 151 Pac. 99 (1915).
"'Gilmore v. Skookum Box Factory, 20 Wash. 703, 56 Pac. 934 (1899) ; Main
v. Johnson, 7 Wash. 321, 35 Pac. 67 (1893).
.. Allen v. Chambers, 13 Wash. 327, 43 Pac. 57 (1895). See WASH. REV. CoDE§ 19.72.100 (1959).
" Kolmitz v. Jansen, 130 Wash. 308, 313, 226 Pac. 1023, 1026 (1924) (even if
evidence admissible, on facts the indorser Nwas liable).
", UCC § 3-414, comment 1.
"'Fidelity Nat'1 Bank v. E. H. Stanton Co., 93 Wash. 344, 160 Pac. 960 (1916).
White v. Armstrong, 166 Wash. 346, 7 P.2d 12 (1932).
"' Nethercutt v. Hopkins, 38 Wash. 577, 80 Pac. 798 (1905).
"' Walsh v. Westcoatt, 131 Wash. 314, 230 Pac. 160 (1924).
... Tacoma Mill Co. v. Sherwood, 11 Wash. 492, 39 Pac. 977 (1895).
...Win. P. Harper & Son v. Pacific Powver & Light Co., 143 Wash. 456, 255 Pac.
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for non-negotiability is the absence of the critical words "order" or
"bearer." A very significant Code provision makes this section of the
Code determinative of the liability of one who indorses such an
instrument."'
Section 3-415. Contract of Accommodation Party.
(1) An accommodation party is one who signs the instrument in
any capacity for the purpose of lending his name to another
party to it.
(2) When the instrument has been taken for value before it is due
the accommodation party is liable in the capacity in which he
has signed even though the taker knows of the accommodation.
(3) As against a holder in due course and without notice of the
accommodation oral proof of the accommodation is not admis-
sible to give the accommodation party the benefit of discharges
dependent on his character as such. In other cases the accom-
modation character may be shown by oral proof.
(4) An indorsement which shows that it is not in the chain of title
is notice of its accommodation character.
(5) An accommodation party is not liable to the party accommo-
dated, and if he pays the instrument has a right of recourse on
the instrument against such party.
The interaction of legal principles separately developed in distinct
categories of the law frequently poses difficult problems. No exception
is the admixture of negotiable instruments principles with principles
of suretyship. The surety who indorses a note is a secondary party
under either set of doctrines. His liability, thus, will be subject to
defenses arising from three principal sources: (1) the law of simple
contracts, such as the requirement of consideration, the effect of
payment, and the like; (2) the law of negotiable instruments, such
as the requirements of presentment, notice of dishonor, protest and
the like; and (3) the law of suretyship, with its occasional discharge
of the surety because of conduct involving a release or an extension
of time to the principal debtor without the consent of the surety. So
long as the surety occupied the secondary position on the note, no
really great problems were presented under the pre-Code law.
949 (1927); Bright v. Offield, 81 Wash. 442, 143 Pac. 159 (1914), 3 CAL F. L. REV.
144 (1915).
UCC § 3-805.
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Not infrequently, the actual relationship existing between parties
to a note transaction will be misrepresented by the form of the note.
The principal debtor, that is to say the one who, when the smoke clears,
ought to bear the risk of having to pay, may appear on the note as a
secondary party. This comes about in a situation wherein an obliging
fellow makes a note payable to the principal debtor in order that the
principal debtor may cash the note or otherwise use it to put himself
in funds. The principal debtor appears as payee and, when he borrows
the money, as indorser. Whatever the circumstances revealed by the
note, the true relationship is such that ultimate responsibility ought
to rest on the fellow who was befriended.
Section 3-415 of the Code deals with this kind of problem, but in
subparagraph (1) the Code emphasizes that the reason why the prin-
cipal debtor ought to bear the ultimate burden of payment is a conse-
quence of the relationship that exists, not because of any lack of con-
sideration for the friend's signing. The presence of consideration for
the promise was thought to be determinative under pre-Code law. 1'
It does not determine whether or not a particular signature is an
accommodation signature under the Code.'52 Of course, absence of
consideration may constitute a defense to the surety because his lia-
bility is contractual. Further, the nature of the suretyship contract
is such that when community liability is sought to be imposed, absence
of benefit to the community may be a defense. 53 Fundamental to the
transaction, then, is an underlying suretyship relationship.'
The note, however, says otherwise, and by virtue of paragraph (2)
of section 3-415, the liability of the signer to one who takes for value
is in the capacity in which he has signed. Thus, a maker is primarily
liable, not entitled to presentment, notice and protest.'55 An indorser,
however, whether he indorses before or after maturity, is secondarily
liable, entitled to have presentment first made to the maker.'56 So
'Eder v. Nelson, 41 Wn. 2d 58, 247 P2d 230 (1952); Lincoln Trust Co. v.
Spangler, 121 Wash. 267, 209 Pac. 521 (1922), 32 YALE L.J. 405 (1923).
UCC § 3-415, comment 2.
Peterson v. Zimmerman, 142 Wash. 385, 253 Pac. 642 (1927).
"I Corporate power to become a surety may be a factor, as in O'Brien v. Turner,
174 Wash. 266, 24 P2d 641 (1933). Certain statutory provisions respecting surety-
ship will also become involved, as in Kirkland Land & Improvement Co. v. Jones,
18 Wash. 407, 51 Pac. 1043 (1898).
"In re Herich, 187 Wash. 21, 59 P2d 748 (1936) ; Bank of Cal. v. Starrett, 110
Wash. 231, 188 Pac. 410 (1920), 9 A.L.R. 177, 90 CENT. L.J. 394; First Bank v.
Tjosevig, 138 Wash. 231, 244 Pac. 736 (1926). To the extent that these cases may
mean something more than this, they ought not be followed. That is to say, to the
extent that they suggest that suretyship defenses are unavailable on negotiable instru-
ments, they are rejected by the Code.
"' The Washington decisions have not been too clear on this matter, for they
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long as value is given for the instrument prior to maturity, the accom-
modation signer is liable even though the holder knew of the fact
that the signature was an accommodation to another.'57 Usually,
consideration moves to the person accommodated and this is sufficient
to support the liability of the accommodation party.' Thus an exten-
sion of time of payment of a debt will be consideration for the added
signature of a surety.'59 The detailed circumstances which under
pre-Code law have been adequate to impose liability on an accommo-
dation party will not be recited here,1 60 because the Code has intro-
duced something new. Let it be supposed that a debt on a note is
due and without any extension or other change in the obligation a
new signature is put on the note at the request of the holder. Pre-Code
law would suggest that there is no consideration for the added signa-
ture, but the Code is to the contrary. 6' The effect of an antecedent
debt as consideration has, in this situation, been expanded.
The preceding paragraph has expanded the language of paragraph
(2) of section 3-415 to demonstrate that the form of the note will
determine the relationship of the parties insofar as negotiable instru-
ments principles are significant. One who purchases a note without
awareness of the underlying background is entitled to whatever solace
he can gain from proceeding on the note as it is written. One who
knows that there is an underlying suretyship relationship involved,
however, meets other obstacles. The technicalities are familiar-a
surety will be discharged by extension of time to which he has not
consented, absent reservation of rights, or by releases of the principal
debtor, and the like. The details are covered in another Code sec-
tion,'62 but by virtue of paragraph (3) of the presently discussed
section, parol evidence is admissible to show the true underlying
seem to suggest that all accommodation parties, whatever their position on the note,
occupy precisely the same position. Continental Mut. Say. Bank v. Elliott, 166 Wash.
283, 6 P.2d 638 (1932) ; Northern Bank & Trust Co. v. Graves, 79 Wash. 411, 140
Pac. 328 (1914) ; Gleeson v. Lichty, 62 Wash. 656, 114 Pac. 518 (1911).
' Goodsell v. Phillips, 130 Wash. 120, 227 Pac. 13 (1924) ; Metzger v. Sigall,
83 Wash. 80, 145 Pac. 72 (1914) ; Donnerberg v. Oppenheimer, 15 Wash. 290, 46 Pac.
254 (1896).
" This point seems to have been overlooked in Weeks v. Bussell, 8 Wash. 440,
36 Pac. 265 (1894).
" Katz v. Judd, 108 Wash. 557, 185 Pac. 613 (1919); Rattelmiller v. Stone, 28
Wash. 104, 68 Pac. 168 (1902).
" Illustrative, along with the cases cited in the discussion of WAsH. REv. CODE
§ 62A. 3-408, are Pierce v. Lowenthal, 161 Wash. 336, 295 Pac. 1021 (1931) ; Northern
Bank & Trust Co. v. Coffin, 113 Wash. 326, 194 Pac. 404 (1920) ; Nicholson v. Neary,
77 Wash. 294, 137 Pac. 492 (1914); Wilkie v. Chandon, 1 Wash. 355, 25 Pac. 464
(1890).
UCC § 3-408. Cf. Dittmar v. Frye, 200 Wash. 451, 93 P.2d 709 (1939).1'UCC § 3-606.
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situation, and thus to open the door for those defenses, except as to
a holder in due course without knowledge of the accommodation. 63
This does not mean that the parol evidence bars are down for all
purposes. Thus one may not show that there was an oral agreement
that he was not to be held liable at all.' But one who knows of the
suretyship relationship must respect it insofar as suretyship defenses
are concerned. 6 5 Such knowledge may be carried on the instrument
itself in the case of an anomalous indorsement, not in the chain of
title,'66 by virtue of paragraph (4). Another instance in which the
form of the note will carry notice of the existence of a suretyship
relation is a signature by one of two or more primary parties with the
added words, "Payment guaranteed." By virtue of section 3-416(5)
a presumption of accommodation arises.
The preceding discussion has involved the rights of the holder of the
instrument, the creditor in the suretyship pattern. The final paragraph
of section 3-415 controls the relative rights and duties of the accommo-
dating and accommodated party inter se. The latter may not profit at
the expense of the former, and so may not force ultimate responsi-
bility on the surety.16 7 If the surety pays, accordingly, he may have
reimbursement which, under the Code, is a right of recourse on the
"The admissibility of parol evidence to establish the suretyship relationship
seems to have been recognized in Washington. Eder v. Nelson, 41 Wn. 2d 58, 247
P.2d 230 (1952); Baldwin v. Daly, 41 Wash. 416, 83 Pac. 724 (1906); Bank of
B.C. v. Jeffs, 15 Wash. 230, 46 Pac. 247 (1896). There was, however, because of the
wording of NIL § 119 [Wash. Rev. Code § 62.01.119 (1955)], some doubt whether this
permitted use of all suretyship defenses in favor of one who signed as maker.
Dove v. Cowlitz Valley Bank, 191 Wash. 429, 71 P.2d 555 (1937); In re Hemrich,
187 Wash. 21, 59 P.2d 748 (1936) ; Bradley Eng'r & Mfg. Co. v. Heyburn, 56 Wash.
628, 106 Pac. 170 (1910).
""Woodland State Bank v. McKean, 118 Wash. 451, 203 Pac. 939 (1922), 22
CoLuM. L. REv. 481 (1922); Bank of Cal. v. Starrett, 110 Wash. 231, 188 Pac. 410(1920), 9 A.L.R. 177, 90 CENT. L.J. 394. Cf. Raby v. Commercial Banking Corp.,
3 U.C.C. REP. SEav. 491 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1966) (accommodation nature of signature may
be shown to defeat defense of usury where primary obligor was a corporation).
"This has not always been the Washington rule insofar as accommodation
makers are concerned. Kuhn v. Groll, 118 Wash. 285, 203 Pac. 44 (1922). The matter
may also be affected by collateral matters, such as reservation of rights or the
existence of indemnity for the surety. McDougall v. Walling, 21 Wash. 478, 58 Pac.
669 (1899); Boston Nat'l Bank v. Jose, 10 Wash. 185, 38 Pac. 1026 (1894).
'As was decided in Clausen v. Forehand, 152 Wash. 310, 277 Pac. 827 (1929),
the accommodation nature of the indorsement does not affect the requirement of
notice of non-payment.
" Lyons v. McNaughton, 65 Wn. 2d 297, 396 P.2d 885 (1964); Eder v. Nelson,
43 Wn. 2d 536, 262 P.2d 180 (1953); Eder v. Nelson, 41 Wn. 2d 58, 247 P.2d 230
(1952) ; Holland v. Tjosevig, 109 Wash. 142, 186 Pac. 317 (1919), 90 CENT. LJ. 215
(1920) ; Pease v. Syler, 78 Wash. 24, 128 Pac. 310 (1914). A factual question is
presented, however, whether the suretyship relationship actually exists. Bettinger
v. Scully, 36 Wash. 596, 79 Pac. 203 (1905) ; Shead v. Moore, 31 Wash. 283, 71 Pac.
1010 (1903) ; Furth v. Baxter, 24 Wash. 608, 64 Pac. 798 (1901).
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instrument itself. 6 8
In some states, a sixth paragraph is added, imposing warranty
liability upon an accommodation party.'69 This points up a major
point: the liability of an accommodation party who signs as indorser
is that stated in section 3-414. Because the accommodation party is
usually not a transferor or presenter of the instrument, the added
warranty liability of section 3-417 is not imposed.
Section 3-416. Contract of Guarantor.
(1) "Payment guaranteed" or equivalent words added to a signa-
ture mean that the signer engages that if the instrument is not
paid when due he will pay it according to its tenor without
resort by the holder to any other party.
(2) "Collection guaranteed" or equivalent words added to a signa-
ture mean that the signer engages that if the instrument is not
paid when due he will pay it according to its tenor, but only
after the holder has reduced his claim against the maker or
acceptor to judgment and execution has been returned unsatis-
fied, or after the maker or acceptor has become insolvent or it is
otherwise apparent that it is useless to proceed against him.
(3) Words of guaranty which do not otherwise specify guarantee
payment.
(4) No words of guaranty added to the signature of a sole maker
or acceptor affect his liability on the instrument. Such words
added to the signature of one of two or more makers or accept-
ors create a presumption that the signature is for the accommo-
dation of the others.
(5) When words of guaranty are used presentment, notice of dis-
honor and protest are not necessary to charge the user.
(6) Any guaranty written on the instrument is enforcible notwith-
standing any statute of frauds.
The observation made in introducing the discussion of the preceding
section regarding the intermingling of legal principles derived from
different categories is relevant here. One indorsing an instrument,
adding words such as "Payment guaranteed," or "Collection guaran-
"6 This would seem to change the rule adopted in Austin v. Hamilton, 7 Wash.
382, 34 Pac. 1097 (1893). In that case the guarantor's right of reimbursement was
distinguished from his right on the note. Thus, a provision for attorney fees in the
note was held inapplicable to the suit for reimbursement.
l °Penney, New York Revisits the Code: Variations in the New York Enact-
went of the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 CoLum. L. REv. 992, 1000 (1962).
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teed," on the instrument prior to his signature becomes involved with
two branches of the law, the law of suretyship and guaranty and the
law of negotiable instruments. This Code section details the conse-
quences of such an admixture, but does not go much beyond: it is
not a restatement of the entire law of suretyship. It does, however,
have an impact on signatures on non-negotiable instruments by virtue
of section 3-805.
The signatures described in the preceding paragraph serve two
functions: first, they transfer the instrument; 170 second, they create
liability on the signer's part. The second function is covered by this
section.
"Payment guaranteed" is essentially a waiver of the normal condi-
tions precedent to the liability of an indorser 7 Washington's court
was called upon at an early day to interpret these words on the back
of a negotiable instrument: "For value received, payment of the
within, at maturity, is hereby guaranteed, waiving demand, notice
and protest. Henry Hewitt, Jr. For thirty days. 1 2 Within the thirty
day period, the signer was liable as if he had been the maker, insofar
as negotiable instruments law principles are concerned. But what
was his liability on the thirty-first day and thereafter? The court
seems to have read out the thirty-day limitation, choosing to hold
that the waiver was effective beyond that period. Perhaps a fairer
interpretation would have been that the waiver was effective only for
the thirty day period, but beyond that time the liability was that of
the normal indorser. After all, his signature on the instrument meant
something quite different from his signature on a separate document.
It would, thus, scarcely be appropriate that the signer's liability termi-
nate at the end of the thirtieth day.
"Payment guaranteed" prior to an indorsement raises not only
negotiable instruments law problems, which have been discussed, but
problems of suretyship and guaranty as well. The extent to which
suretyship principles apply would seem to be determined by the
contract undertaken. Although the Official Comment and the preced-
ing paragraph of this discussion have referred to the signer's liability
as that of co-maker, this must not be taken literally, for essential to
the obligation is a recognition of suretyship principles. One would not
doubt, for example, that an extension of time granted to the actual
This aspect is governed by UCC § 3-2029(4).
"Sherman, Clay & Co. v. Turner, 164 Wash. 257,2 P.2d 688 (1931).
"'Sewvard v. Derickson, 12 Wash. 225, 40 Pac. 939 (1895).
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maker would discharge the guarantor, unless there was a reservation
of rights or consent. 173 This defense arises from the law of suretyship,
not from the law of negotiable instruments, and is thus preserved.
On the other hand, the doctrine of Pain v. Packard174 as statutorily
codified in Washington,'75 would not seem applicable. That is to say,
the guarantor of payment is not permitted to require the creditor to
proceed first against the primary maker. A recent Washington decision,
therefor, is expected to be followed under the Code. 6 The explanation
is that requiring suit against the maker as a condition precedent to a
claim against the guarantor is not consistent with the guarantor's
contract. He could have obtained the benefit of such a condition by
using different words, and the Code permits this by the use of "Collec-
tion guaranteed.' 7 7
Since most of the details of this Code section are without prior
authority in Washington, this section will fill gaps in the law.
Section 3-417. Warranties on Presentment and Transfer.
(1) Any person who obtains payment or acceptance and any prior
transferor warrants to a person who in good faith pays or
accepts that
(a) he has a good title to the instrument or is authorized to ob-
tain payment or acceptance on behalf of one who has a good
title; and
(b) he has no knowledge that the signature of the maker or
drawer is unauthorized, except that this warranty is not
given by a holder in due course acting in good faith
(i) to a maker with respect to the maker's own signature; or
As in Van de Ven v. Overlook Mining & Dev. Co., 146 Wash. 332, 262 Pac.
981 (1928). Analogously, a guarantor who pays may recover from the primary
obligor. Austin v. Hamilton, 7 Wash. 382, 34 Pac. 1097 (1893).
The question of the signer's power to execute a guaranty would also be raised.
Creditors' Claim & Adjustment Co. v. Northwest Loan & Trust Co., 81 Wash. 247,
142 Pac. 670 (1914), 1917A L.R.A. 737.
Obviously, consideration would be required for the guaranty, but one would think
that UCC § 3-408 would apply to make this an affirmative defense placing the burden
upon the signer, as in O'Brien v. Turner, 174 Wash. 266, 24 P.2d 641 (1933). Any
consideration, such as an extension of time, would bind the guarantor. Puget Sound
Nat'l Bank v. Olsen, 174 Wash. 200, 24 P.2d 613 (1933). Indeed, under UCC § 3-408,
it may be doubted whether an extension is required.
Alteration of the contract would be a defense. O'Connor v. Slatter, 48 Wash. 493,
93 Pac. 1078 (1908).
13 Johns. R. 174 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816).
'
7 WAsH. REV. CODE §§ 19.72.100-.101 (1959).
'
0 Amick v. Baugh, 66 Wn. 2d 298, 402 P2d 342 (1965).
"
m Accord, Macy v. Inland Empire Land Co., 145 Wash. 523, 260 Pac. 1073 (1927).
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(ii) to a drawer with respect to the drawer's own signature,
whether or not the drawer is also the drawee; or
(iii) to an acceptor of a draft if the holder in due course took
the draft after the acceptance or obtained the accept-
ance without knowledge that the drawer's signature was
unauthorized; and
(c) the instrument has not been materially altered, except that
this warranty is not given by a holder in due course acting in
good faith
(i) to the maker of a note; or
(ii) to the drawer of a draft whether or not the drawer is
also the drawee; or
(iii) to the acceptor of a draft with respect to an alteration
made prior to the acceptance if the holder in due course
took the draft after the acceptance, even though the
acceptance provided "payable as originally drawn" or
equivalent terms; or
(iv) to the acceptor of a draft with respect to an alteration
made after the acceptance.
(2) Any person who transfers an instrument and receives consider-
ation warrants to his transferee and if the transfer is by indorse-
ment to any subsequent holder who takes the instrument in
good faith that
(a) he has a good title to the instrument or is authorized to obtain
payment or acceptance on behalf of one who has a good title
and the transfer is otherwise rightful; and
(b) all signatures are genuine or authorized; and
(c) the instrument has not been materially altered; and
(d) no defense of any party is good against him.; and
(e) he has no knowledge of any insolvency proceeding instituted
with respect to the maker or acceptor or the drawer of an
unaccepted instrument.
(3) By transferring "without recourse" the transferor limits the
obligation stated in subsection (2) (d) to a warranty that he
has no knowledge of such a defense.
(4) A selling agent or broker who does not disclose the fact that
he is acting only as such gives the warranties provided in this
1968 ]
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section, but if he makes such disclosure warrants only his good
faith and authority.
Prior to the enactment of the Code, a person who paid an instrument
was not protected by warranties made on indorsement or transfer." 8
To recover payment, he had to sue on the theory of money paid under
mistake of fact, often with a gloss of comparative negligence." 9 The
consequences of this absence of warranty are many, but they have not
been of particular concern in Washington. In two sections, the Code
makes a sweeping change by imposing warranty liability in favor of
one who pays an instrument.1 80 There are many details of this liability
yet to be judicially worked out. One such concerns the complexities
of the Statute of Limitations: when does the cause of action accrue,
and is liability based on an oral or written contract?' 8 Another
concerns the extent to which diligence on the part of the payor is a
factor. Strangely enough, the Code seems to have two inconsistent
provisions, requiring prompt action in one place, 8' but not in the
presently discussed section.18' In one instance, that of missing indorse-
ments, there may be room for difference of opinion as to whether an
effective warranty is made, although superficially it would appear
that absence of an indorsement necessary to the title of the presenter
would equate to a breach of the warranty of title. 4 The circumstance
of the forged indorsement is clearer, for certainly the forgery of an
indorsement necessary to the presenter's title is a nullity 85 and thus
the title is defective.
The circumstance of the forged signature of a maker or drawer is
somewhat more complex. If the instrument is presented directly to
the maker or drawer, he ought to know whether he executed the
instrument or not, and if he pays there is little in his favor warranting
recovery. Whether this is true of a large and complex operation, such
as the United States Treasury, is subject to controversy, but the Code
"7 National Bank of Commerce v. Seattle Nat'l Bank, 109 Wash. 312, 187 Pac.
342 (1920).
Canadian Bank of Commerce v. Bingham, 30 Wash. 484, 71 Pac. 53 (1902),
60 L.R.A. 955.
UCC §§ 3-417, 4-207.
... United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 231 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y.
1964) ; see Luedemann, Warranties on the Transfer of a Negotiable Instrument-
UCC 3-417(2), 17 STAN. L. REv. 77, 82 (1964).
'
8 UCC § 4-207(4).
For criticism, see Luedemann, supra note 181.
O'Malley, Liability for Missing Indorsentents, 81 BANKING L.J. 659 (1964).
UCC § 3-404.
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does not distinguish between large and small operators. 8 If the
presenter actually knew that the signature of the maker or drawer
was forged, however, his position in equity is hardly- superior to the
drawer or maker, so recovery is plausible. The wording of the Code
on this point, however, seems destined to cause trouble, for it seems
to assume that such a person may, with knowledge of the forgery,
still act in good faith so as to keep the payment.187
The forgery of a drawer's signature followed by payment by the
drawee is the classic Price v. Nea' 88 pattern. The drawee is not
permitted to recover such payment, for under the Code the presenter
warrants only that he does not know that there was a forgery. If the
recipient of the money actually knew, then, when he received the pay-
ment that the signature of the drawer was forged, the paying drawee
could recover on breach of warranty theory. This is the only exception,
and carelessness on the part of the recipient of the money is of no
import.
Finally, the Code deals with altered instruments. The traditional
attitude has been that a drawee may be charged with knowledge of
the drawer's signature, but not with knowledge of the form of the
instrument at the time it was drawn. This being the underlying
assumption, a drawee was permitted to recover payments made on
altered instruments. The Code adopts this view. Payments made by
primary parties, however, are treated differently. A maker of a note
may be held to know the tenor of the instrument he executed, so if
it is later altered and presented for payment, he should not pay the
altered tenor. If he does, his payment will be final.'89 Again, the
relative equities of the payor and payee are germane, and a non-due-
course holder is disfavored by the Code's imposition of a warranty
against alteration in this instance. 90
Paragraph (2) of this Code section is not a substantial departure
from prior law, for the warranties on transfer have long been estab-
lished.' " To be observed, however, is the theory of the Code: the
warranties are imposed as a consequence of the transfer of the paper.
'm Cf. United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 205 Fed. 433 (9th Cir.
1913).
"See UCC HANDBOOK 117-18 (1964) ; Tull, New Mexico: Uniform Commercial
Code: Warranties and the Myth of the "Shelter Provision," 4 NAT. REs. L.J. 398
(1964).
(93 Burr. 1345 (1762).
' UCC 3-418.
"'UCC 3-417(1) (c).
"NIL §8 65, 66 [WAsH. REv. CODE §§ 62.01.065, .066 (1955)].
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The indorsement is important only as a mechanism of transfer. Thus,
an accommodation indorser will not be liable for the warranties here
stated.92
The warranties imposed are straight-forward enough, and they may
be modified only modestly by the use of a qualified indorsement,
"without recourse."' 93 Even with such words, the indorser is not
able to eliminate entirely his warranty undertaking, as is dearly stated
in paragraph (3). Whether the addition of qualifying language mili-
tates against the transferee's being a due course holder is covered
elsewhere.'
Section 3-418. Finality of Payment or Acceptance.
Except for recovery of bank payments as provided in the Article
on Bank Deposits and Collections (Article 4) and except for liability
for breach of warranty on presentment under the preceding section,
payment or acceptance of any instrument is final in favor of a
holder in due course, or a person who has in good faith changed
his position in reliance on the payment.
This section, when read with the preceding section, sets the limits
on recovery of payments made by mistake of fact. A typical illustra-
tion is money paid by a drawee against insufficient funds. In view of
the fact that there is no warranty covering this situation made by the
presenter under the preceding section, the payment is final and not
recoverable. This was the rule followed prior to the Code.'95 The
pre-Code cases were not always definitive as to what kinds of persons
are protected by this finality doctrine,' but the Code makes it clear
that only due course holders or persons who have in good faith relied
on the payment are protected.'97
" For criticism, see Luedemann, supra note 181, at 92.
"They may not be qualified by a prior or simultaneous parol agreement. Fidelity
Nat'l Bank v. Hosea, 93 Wash. 344, 160 Pac. 960 (1916).
'UCC § 3-302; Banner Meat Co. v. Rieger, 125 Wash. 142, 215 Pac. 334 (1923)
(indorsee may be a holder in due course); American Say. Bank & Trust Co. v.
Helgesen, 64 Wash. 54, 116 Pac. 837 (1911), aff'd, 67 Wash. 572, 122 Pac. 26 (1912).
Oregon Iron & Steel Co. v. Kelso State Bank, 129 Wash. 109, 224 Pac. 569
(1924), 38 A.L.R. 178; Spokane & E. Trust Co. v. Huff, 63 Wash. 225, 115 Pac. 80
(1911), 33 A.L.R. (n.s.) 1023.
.. Zwickel v. American Say. Bank & Trust Co., 69 Wash. 211, 124 Pac. 386
(1912) ; Canadian Bank of Commerce v. Bingham, 46 Wash. 657, 91 Pac. 185 (1906)
(may have allowed recovery of the money from the recipient predicated on its
negligence; not a factor under the Code). See 2 B.C. IND. & Comm. L. zEv. 383 (1961).
'Accord, National City Bank v. Titlow, 233 Fed. 838 (W.D. Wash. 1916);
Merchants' Bank v. Superior Candy & Cracker Co., 41 Wash. 653, 84 Pac. 604
(1906).
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Finality is accorded to payment and acceptance. Because of the
use of credit and debit entries in accomplishing payment between
banks, pre-Code decisions were in conflict as to when payment had
occurred. Hopefully, the Code has narrowed the zone of controversy
by its specific provisions."9 8
Section 3419. Conversion of Instrument; Innocent Representa.
tive.
(1) An instrument is converted when
(a) a drawee to whom it is delivered for acceptance refuses to
return it on demand; or
(b) any person to whom it is delivered for payment refuses on
demand either to pay or to return it; or
(c) it is paid on a forged indorsement.
(2) In an action against a drawee under subsection (1) the measure
of the drawee's liability is the face amount of the instrument.
In any other action under subsection (1) the measure of liabil-
ity is presumed to be the face amount of the instrument.
(3) Subject to the provisions of this Act concerning restrictive
indorsements a representative, including a depositary or col-
lecting bank, who has in good faith and in accordance with the
reasonable commercial standards applicable to the business of
such representative dealt with an instrument or its proceeds on
behalf of one who was not the true owner is not liable in con-
version or otherwise to the true owner beyond the amount of
any proceeds remaining in his hands.
(4) An intermediary bank or payor bank which is not a depositary
bank is not liable in conversion solely by reason of the fact
that proceeds of an item indorsed restrictively (Sections 3-205
and 3-206) are not paid or applied consistently with the restric-
tive indorsement of an indorser other than its immediate trans-
feror.
It has long been recognized in Washington that a negotiable instru-
ment is property subject to conversion.'99 Although subsection (1)
is a restatement of existing law, it does not state the entire law; there
UCC §§ 4-213, 4-303.
'Plymouth Collateral Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 188 Wash. 344, 62 P.2d 734(1936) (theory not stated); California Stucco Co. v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 148 Wash.
341, 268 Pac. 891 (1928), 67 A.L.R. 1531, 4 WAsH. L. REv. 42.
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are other ways in which an instrument may be converted. For example,
in Clapp v. Johnson,0 ° a debtor had pledged a note, payable to a
third person but indorsed in blank. After the debt was satisfied, the
bank (pledgee) returned the note to the payee. The pledgee was held
liable for the face amount of the note, plus interest, on the theory
of conversion. If paragraph (1) is read as an exhaustive list of the
ways in which an instrument may be converted, the rule of the Clapp
case is changed. However, it is inconceivable that this is the intended
consequence, and one is not committed to read the conversion methods
listed as exclusive.
The excessive attention focused on refusal to return an instrument
and on payment under forged indorsements is due to the doubt in
this area of pre-Code law.201 Washington seems to have recognized
that a drawee converts an instrument by paying on a forged indorse-
ment 2  There is some suggestion that the theory of liability is that
of quasi-contract,203 but this seems of doubtful applicability to a
paying drawee. Quasi-contract suggests unjust enrichment, and the
drawee has not received any funds by which it is enriched. Since
another person collecting from the drawee under a forged indorse-
ment is enriched, however, quasi-contract is directly relevant. Unless
the statute of limitations is a factor, both the drawee and the person
receiving the money are subject to a tort suit.
A modest excitement was stirred by a decision in Massachusetts
under the Code, 204 raising a question as to whose property is converted
in the circumstances of payment under a forged indorsement. The
problem is posed by paragraph (3) of the presently discussed section,
due to its reference to the "true owner." The holding was that the
drawer is not the true owner; but the decision is not without its
critics.0 5 Since the person whose name was forged will normally be
186 Wash. 327, 57 P.2d 1235 (1936).
See BRITTON, BILLS AND NoTEs § 146 (2d ed. 1961).
"
2 Anderson v. National Bank, 146 Wash. 520, 264 Pac. 8 (1928).
' Bruce v. First Nat'l Bank, 180 Wash. 614, 41 P.2d 779 (1935).
The first Code decision on the point accords with the Washington court's dictum
that the drawee is liable either in a tort suit or in a suit predicated on implied
contract (quasi-contract). Weilersbacher v. Pittsburg Brewing Co., 3 U.C.C. REP.
SERV. 311 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1966). The decision reached is not, however, compelled by
the Code. The Code states that the drawee is liable for conversion, but it does not
detail the theory or set a statute of limitations. UCC § 3-122 states a limitation
period, but it pertains to liability on the instrument not to liability dehors the
instrument (as here by conversion) and not to warranty liability.
'Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1,
184 N.E.2d 358 (1962), 99 A.L.R.2d 628.
' Compare the discussions in 43 B.U.L. REV. 144 (1963), and 4 B.C. IxD. & CoiM.
L. REv. 449 (1963).
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the true owner, it is he who benefits by recovery on a theory of
conversion. The person paying the instrument under the forged in-
dorsement will proceed on a theory of warranty under section 3-417,
rather than on a theory of conversion. The drawer will be protected
because the drawee will not be permitted to charge his account for
the sum paid out on the forgery2 °6
This difference in theory is not entirely academic, because the
liability of banks which innocently convert paper by handling it after
a forged indorsement may or may not be discharged by the bank's
having paid over to the person instituting collection. The presently
discussed section relieves such a bank from liability to the extent it
has paid over, so a payee whose name was forged must look to the
drawee or to the dishonest forger in most instances. °T The drawee,
however, who has the advantage of the warranties stated in section
4-207, may be relentless in pursuing any bank in the collection chain,
for change of position is no defense to that section's liability. 08 Once
the drawee starts this chain of recovery, each collecting bank (whether
it has remitted or not) is also liable on a theory of breach of warranty;
thus the protection arising from change of position is somewhat
illusory.
The effect of restrictive indorsements, referred to in paragraphs
(3) and (4), is substantially circumscribed by the Code's theory that
banks in the normal collection chain are governed only by instructions
received from their immediate customers and only by restrictive in-
dorsements of such customers. Other banks may ignore those prior
indorsements, and thus are not held as converters.20 9
The quantum of liability stated in the Code sharpens the rule
previously announced in Washington, for the decisional law suggests
that the liability of any converter is the face amount of the instru-
ment.2 10 This is the Code's measure insofar as the drawee is concerned,
but that amount is subject to reduction by any other converter on a
showing that the face amount of the note would not have been paid
in any event, as where the obligor is insolvent.
SUCC § 4-401.
The actual result reached in two Washington cases may be changed by this
rule: Plymouth Collateral Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 188 Wash. 344, 62 P2d 734
(1936); California Stucco Co. v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 148 Wash. 341, 268 Pac. 891
(1928). In both cases liability was imposed on a bank in the collecting chain.
' UCC § 4-207(3) specifically so provides.
UCC §§ 3-205, 3-206, 4-203, 4-205.
' Clapp v. Johnson, 186 Wash. 327, 57 P.2d 1235 (1936).
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PART 5. PRESENTMENT, NOTICE OF DISHONOR AND PROTEST
Section 3-501. When Presentment, Notice of Dishonor, and
Protest Necessary or Permissible.
(1) Unless excused (Section 3-511) presentment is necessary to
charge secondary parties as follows:
(a) presentment for acceptance is necessary to charge the drawer
and indorsers of a draft where the draft so provides, or is
payable elsewhere than at the residence or place of business
of the drawee, or its date of payment depends upon such
presentment. The holder may at his option present for
acceptance any other draft payable at a stated date;
(b) presentment for payment is necessary to charge any indorser;
(c) in the case of any drawer, the acceptor of a draft payable at
a bank or the maker of a note payable at a bank, presentment
for payment is necessary, but failure to make presentment
discharges such drawer, acceptor or maker only as stated in
Section 3-502 (1) (b).
(2) Unless excused (Section 3-511)
(a) notice of any dishonor is necessary to charge any indorser;
(b) in the case of any drawer, the acceptor of a draft payable at
a bank or the maker of a note payable at a bank, notice of
any dishonor is necessary, but failure to give such notice
discharges such drawer, acceptor or maker only as stated in
Section 3-502 (1) (b).
(3) Unless excused (Section 3-511) protest of any dishonor is neces-
sary to charge the drawer and indorsers of any draft which on
its face appears to be drawn or payable outside of the states
and territories of the United States and the District of Colum-
bia. The holder may at his option make protest of any dishonor
of any other instrument and in the case of a foreign draft may
on insolvency of the acceptor before maturity make protest for
better security.
(4) Notwithstanding any provision of this section, neither present-
ment nor notice of dishonor nor protest is necessary to charge
an indorser who has indorsed an instrument after maturity.
The conditions precedent to the liability of secondary parties
(drawer and indorser) are succinctly stated in this Code section:
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(1) presentment; (2) dishonor (implied as a requirement); (3) notice
of dishonor; and (4) protest. These do not represent any general
change in the law, although there are particular details incorporated
in the Code which are different from pre-Code law.
There is virtually no decisional law in Washington with respect to
presentment for acceptance. An important reminder is that refusal
of acceptance often equates to a dishonor of the bill of exchange,
creating an immediate cause of action against the drawer and indors-
ers.211 In this context, however, a bank's refusal to "accept" or certify
a check is not such a dishonor;212 the drawer and indorsers may be
held only if payment is refused.
With respect to presentment for payment, the Washington law is
consistent with the flat requirement of the Code that there be present-
ment (absent excuse) or the indorser is discharged completely." 3
Paragraph (4) of the section, however, reverses the law previously
followed. Pre-Code decisions have not distinguished an indorser after
maturity from the pre-maturity indorser and have held both entitled
to notice, after presentment and dishonor.214 The reasons for this
about face are stated in the Official Comment.
The extent to which drawers of checks and other drafts are affected
by non-presentment and lack of notice is a matter on which Washing-
ton decisions have not been uniform.215 Under the Code, there is no
discharge if the drawer complies with the specific requirements of
section 3-502(1) (b). The extension of the principle to makers and
acceptors of instruments payable at banks is new. These parties are
obviously primary parties as to whom presentment is not required.
However, by domiciling the paper at the bank, that is to say, by
- UCC §§ 3-507, 3-413, 3-414.
n2UCC § 3-411.
"Anderson v. Sperry, 155 Wash. 300, 284 Pac. 102 (1930) ; Galbraith v. Shepard,
43 Wash. 698, 86 Pac. 1113 (1906).
In Legal Discount Corp. v. Martin Hardware Co., 199 Wash. 476, 91 P.2d 1010(1939), 15 WAsHi. L. REv. 54 (1940), the defendant was both drawer and indorser of
a trade acceptance. The court discharged him as an indorser who had not received
notice, because the drawee had previously accepted the draft. Under the Code, how-
ever, the person who signs both as drawer and indorser would be discharged, one
would think, only by the most technical rule of discharge, not the least technical.
Thus, if he could be held either as indorser or drawer, he ought to be liable. The
problem was not really presented to the court in the cited case, because in pre-Code
law the distinction between discharge of drawers and indorsers was made only in the
case of checks.
" Bardshar v. Chaffee, 90 Wash. 404, 156 Pac. 388 (1916).
"Fick v. Jones, 185 Wash. 365, 55 P.2d 334 (1936) (contrary to Code rule);
Mosher v. Philips, 124 Wash. 118, 213 Pac. 484 (1923) (consistent with Code rule) ;
Morris-Miller Co. v. Von Pressentin, 63 Wash. 74, 114 Pac. 912 (1911) (consistent
with Code rule).
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making it payable there, the maker or acceptor has provided an easy
mechanism for payment, and if the holder fails to use that mechanism,
with consequent loss of funds to the maker, the holder bears the loss.
Washington decisions were contrary, however, so the rule is changed
in this state.216
The instrument may be made payable at a spot other than a bank.
In this case, the maker is not discharged by non-presentment, even
though he may have arranged for payment at the spot stated. In effect,
all the maker has done in such circumstances is to make a tender of
payment, which importantly terminates his liability for interest and
subsequent collection costs,217 but which is not the same as payment.
Somewhat troublesome is the tie-in of a clause making the note
payable at a particular place coupled with an acceleration clause if
there is nonpayment of an installment or of interest. Since the Code
has no direct rule on the matter, the common sense approach of pre-
Code cases will be followed. By those cases, the holder may not
accelerate payment unless he has sought payment at the designated
place or has given the maker an opportunity to pay, or has explained
why such conduct would have been fruitless. 1
The tie-in between acceleration clauses and the requirements of
this Code section will be troublesome at another point. If a holder
has accelerated the time of payment, the indorsers (and the drawer)
are entitled to appropriate notice as of then.219 Thus, if an instrument
permits acceleration on non-payment of interest or an installment
thereof, the holder who accelerates must immediately present the
instrument to the primary party and, on dishonor, notify the indorser.
The resulting discharge of the prior indorsers, however, is personal.
This means that if thereafter the instrument is negotiated to due
course holders, the indorsers are liable even though no notice was
"Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Pearson, 102 Wash. 570, 173 Pac. 730 (1918).
(Note the provision of UCC § 3-121 as adopted in Washington.)
217 UCC § 3-604.
Hartge v. Capeloto, 136 Wash. 538, 241 Pac. 5 (1925); James v. Brainard-
Jackson & Co., 64 Wash. 175, 116 Pac. 633 (1911) ; Bardsley v. Washington Mill
Co., 54 Wash. 553, 103 Pac. 822 (1909). The Bardsley decision was criticized in
Harrison v. Beals, 111 Ore. 563, 222 Pac. 728 (1924).
Normally, of course, there is no requirement of presentment prior to suit against
the maker whether the note is domiciled or not. Hillman v. Stanley, 56 Wash. 320,
105 Pac. 816 (1909). If the instrument is not domiciled, the burden seems to rest on
the obligor to accomplish payment; thus the statement in Delaney v. Nelson, 132
Wash. 472, 232 Pac. 292 (1925), that he has a right to pay at his place of residence
does not seem correct.
" Anderson v. Sperry, 155 Wash. 300, 284 Pac. 102 (1930); Chamberlain v.
Cobb, 129 Wash. 549, 225 Pac. 414 (1924) ; Galbraith v. Shepard, 43 Wash. 698, 86
Pac. 1113 (1906).
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given.220 The troublesome point may concern the liability of the
indorser who, having failed to collect after acceleration, indorses it
to a due course holder. Is he an indorser after maturity within the
meaning of paragraph (4)? The predicted answer would be that he
is not, for nonpayment of interest is not a dishonor of the instrument
and does not affect a due course holder. 221 However, the chances are
that the indorser who transfers in these circumstances can be held on
some warranty theory~l to which presentment is not a condition
precedent.
Paragraphs (2) and (3) of the section greatly simplify the govern-
ing rules in the areas covered. The major change will be the limiting
of the requirement of protest to drafts drawn or payable outside of the
United States. Previously, the geographical limit was the state.223
Insofar as notice is concerned, there is no change insofar as the in-
dorser is completely discharged for lack of notice,224 but the rule is
clarified as to the effect of failure to notify a drawer or obligor on
any instrument payable at a bank.
Section 3-502. Unexcused Delay; Discharge.
(1) Where without excuse any necessary presentment or notice of
dishonor is delayed beyond the time when it is due
(a) any indorser is discharged; and
(b) any drawer or the acceptor of a draft payable at a bank or
the maker of a note payable at a bank who because the
drawee or payor bank becomes insolvent during the delay is
deprived of funds maintained with the drawee or payor bank
to cover the instrument may discharge his liability by written
assignment to the holder of his rights against the drawee or
payor bank in respect of such funds, but such drawer, ac-
ceptor or maker is not otherwise discharged.
(2) Where without excuse a necessary protest is delayed beyond
the time when it is due any drawer or indorser is discharged.
The absolute discharge accorded to indorsers because of a delay in
presentment follows precisely the rule under the NIL.2 5 The rule
- UCC § 3-602.
-UCC § 3-304(4) (f).
- UCC § 3-417.
' NIL §§ 129, 152 [WAsir. REV. CODE §§ 62.01.129, .152 (1955)]; Fosdick v.
Government Mineral Springs Hotel Co., 115 Wash. 127, 196 Pac. 652 (1921).
' Codd v. Von Der Ahe, 92 Wash. 529, 159 Pac. 686 (1916). -
' NIL § 70 [WASH. REv. CoDE § 62.01.070 (1955) ].
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respecting drawers and obligors on other instruments payable at banks
is, however, changed in some respects. Under the former statute,
drawers of instruments other than checks were discharged completely
in the manner of indorsers, by delay in presentment. 26 This, of course,
is not so under the Code. Further, pre-Code law did not clearly state
the effect of non-presentment of notes payable at a bank, so the Code
has a clarifying effect on the point.
With respect to the liability of drawers of checks, the policy is the
same as was enforced previously. One Washington decision seems
to say that presentment for payment to the drawee bank is always a
condition precedent to the drawer's liability on the check, whether the
drawee has failed or not.227 This decision seems to have overlooked or
misinterpreted the statute, and most of the cases hold that the drawer
is discharged only to the extent of loss caused by the failure of the
drawee bank.22 Under the Code, the drawer need only assign his claim
against the failed bank to the holder of the instrument to relieve him-
self from liability.
The failure of the drawee bank is the only cause of loss considered
by the Code. There may be others, but they will be quite rare. In
Hunt v. Panhandle Lumber Co.,229 the payee of a check held it until
the drawer had closed the account and absconded with the funds.
The payee then sought to recoup his loss by imposing a mechanics
lien or logger's lien against property owned by the defendant. The
decision was against the payee's asserted lien, by application of the
"two innocents rule." The Code is not addressed to this kind of case,
in which the loss is sustained by a person other than the drawer and
not a party to the instrument.
Section 3-503. Time of Presentment.
(1) Unless a different time is expressed in the instrument the time
for any presentment is determined as follows:
(a) where an instrument is payable at or a fixed period after a
stated date any presentment for acceptance must be made on
or before the date it is payable;
' BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 195 (2d ed. 1961).
'Fick v. Jones, 185 Wash. 365, 55 P.2d 334 (1936).
'Generaux v. Petit, 172 Wash. 132, 19 P.2d 911 (1933); Pugh v. Doupe, 130
Wash. 498, 228 Pac. 301 (1924); Peninsula Nat'l Bank v. Hans Pederson Const.
Co., 91 Wash. 621, 158 Pac. 246 (1916); Morris-Miller Co. v. Von Pressentin, 63
Wash. 74, 114 Pac. 912 (1911).
' 66 Wash. 645, 120 Pac. 538 (1912).
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(b) where an instrument is payable after sight it must either be
presented for acceptance or negotiated within a reasonable
time after date or issue whichever is later;
(c) where an instrument shows the date on which it is payable
presentment for payment is due on that date;
(d) where an instrument is accelerated presentment for payment
is due within a reasonable time after the acceleration;
(e) with respect to the liability of any secondary party present-
ment for acceptance or payment of any other instrument is
due within a reasonable time after such party becomes liable
thereon.
(2) A reasonable time for presentment is determined by the nature
of the instrument, any usage of banking or trade and the facts
of a particular case. In the case of an uncertified check which
is drawn and payable within the United States and which is not
a draft drawn by a bank the following are presumed to be
reasonable periods within which to present for payment or to
initiate bank collection:
(a) with respect to the liability of the drawer, thirty days after
date or issue whichever is later; and
(b) with respect to the liability of an endorser, seven days after
his indorsement.
(3) Where any presentment is due on a day which is not a full
business day for either the person making presentment or the
party to pay or accept, presentment is due on the next following
day which is a full business day for both parties.
(4) Presentment to be sufficient must be made at a reasonable hour,
and if at a bank during its banking day.
Subsection (1) weaves together the time requirements for presenta-
tion for both payment and acceptance. Instruments having a fixed
maturity date must be presented for payment or acceptance on or
before that date, and must be presented for payment on that date.
Presentment for acceptance is not required in such cases unless the
instrument so provides or unless the place of payment is other than
the residence or place of business of the drawee.30 Nonetheless, a
' UCC § 3-501 (1) (a).
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refusal to accept prior to the maturity date is a dishonor, giving the
holder an immediate cause of action against the drawer and indors-
ers.
231
Instruments payable after sight will require presentment for accept-
ance, 23 2 and the presentment must be made a reasonable time after
date or issue. This reasonable time rule applies, it will be noted, to
demand instruments as well, although the Code introduces a clarifying
point. In the case of demand instruments, presentment must be made
a reasonable time after each party becomes liable on an instrument.
Thus a presentment may be timely with respect to some but not all
of the secondary parties to an instrument. Demand instruments will
normally be presented for payment rather than acceptance (since a
bird in the hand is worth two in the bush), but they may be presented
for acceptance. 3
Another instance in which the time for presentment may differ
among the parties to an instrument is stated in paragraph (2), dealing
with checks. For the first time, a definition of reasonable time for
indorsers is different from that for the drawer. The thirty-day time
limit established as prima facia controlling for the liability of the
drawer of an uncertified check drawn and payable within the United
States is much longer than the accepted pre-Code period. 234  The
seven-day and thirty-day periods are only presumed to be the reason-
able limits on presentment for payment. Thus, a check drawn in
Seattle on a Seattle bank may be mailed to a payee in Japan. Since
the instrument is drawn and payable in Seattle, the thirty-day time
limit is presumed to govern, but under the circumstances it is unlikely
that it would actually control.23
The provision respecting the time for payment of accelerated paper,
that is to say, that it be presented within a reasonable time after the
acceleration, is consistent with pre-Code decisions in Washington. 36
The details stated in paragraphs (3) and (4) are refinements of
NIL provisions which have not been interpreted by the Washington
court.
U 1uC § 3-507(1) (a).
UCC § 3-501 (1) (a).
'The refusal of a drawee bank to certify a check is not, however, a dishonor of
the instrument, because the drawee bank is not obligated to certify. UCC § 3-411(2).
' See Generaux v. Petit, 172 Wash. 132, 19 P.2d 911 (1933) ; German-American
Bank v. Wright, 85 Wash. 460, 148 Pac. 769 (1915).
'Braucher, U.C.C. Article 3-Commercial Paper-New York Variations, 17
RUTGERS L. REV. 57, 74 (1962).
"
8 Anderson v. Sperry, 155 Wash. 300, 284 Pac. 102 (1930).
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Section 3-504. How Presentment Made.
(1) Presentment is a demand for acceptance or payment made
upon the maker, acceptor, drawee or other payor by or on
behalf of the holder.
(2) Presentment may be made
(a) by mail, in which event the time of presentment is deter-
mined by the time of receipt of the mail; or
(b) through a clearing house; or
(c) at the place of acceptance or payment specified in the instru-
ment or if there be none at the place of business or residence
of the party to accept or pay. If neither the party to accept
or pay nor anyone authorized to act for him is present or
accessible at such place presentment is excused.
(3) It may be made
(a) to any one of two or more makers, acceptors, drawees or
other payors; or
(b) to any person who has authority to make or refuse the ac-
ceptance or payment.
(4) A draft accepted or a note made payable at a bank in the
United States must be presented at such bank.
(5) In the cases described in Section 4-210 presentment may be
made in the manner and with the result stated in that section. -
The technical requirements of presentment have been substantially
reduced by the Code. In essence, all that is required is a demand for
payment or acceptance. The instrument need not be shown, unless
the obligor requests to see it.237 If he does demand its exhibition
the presenter has a reasonable time in which to comply.238 There is
a temptation to say that the requirements are so far minimized that
a telephoned demand for payment is a sufficient presentment. The
pre-Code rule was well established to the contrary, however, 239 and
the question seems sufficiently open under the Code to make caution
the better part of valor. In short, a face-to-face or mailed demand
ought to be used. Whether the Code actually requires this caution is
UCC § 3-505.
3Ibid.
' Cowles v. Matthews, 179 Wash. 154, 36 P.2d 537 (1934); 3 PATON'S DIGEST
oP LEGAL OPiNs 3202 (1944).
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conjectural. The simplistic definition of presentment in paragraph(1)
does not outlaw a telephoned demand. True, the obligor may demand
to see the instrument, but unless he does so, the presentment is accom-
plished by the demand without exhibition. If when telephoned, he
demands to see the instrument, the holder may then make face-to-face
or mailed presentment.
On the other hand, paragraph (2) states approved methods of
presentment and none of them clearly condone use of the telephone.
Paragraph (2) (c) permitting presentment at the place of acceptance
may be a clue, for the demand for payment made by telephone may
be made at the transmitting end and thus not at the place specified.
There is, however, no requirement of presentment at the places named.
Finally, one departure which the Code has authorized permits present-
ment in limited instances by notice that an instrument is being held.
In the governing Code section, a written notice is required. 4 This
obviously means that telephoned notices are not adequate for com-
pliance with the particular means of presentment there authorized.
One may generalize from this that they are not adequate otherwise
either.241
A detail about which pre-Code decisions differed is clarified by this
section. There was some doubt whether a bank could make proper
presentment by mailing an instrument directly to the obligor or to
the drawee. 4  The Code permits such presentment. 43
Paragraph (3) deals with the person to whom presentment is to be
made. Subparagraph (a), by permitting presentment to any one
(and not all) of multiple makers, acceptors or drawees reverses the
heretofore followed Washington law.244 Presentment to all such parties
was formerly required.
Subparagraph (b) may, or may not, change the rule followed in
Aisted v. Grim.245 There, presentment made to an attorney represent-
ing the obligor was held to be insufficient. This seems to be the ex-
pected result under the Code, because there is no presumption, cer-
2,0 UCC § 4-210.
, See 77te Low of Presentment of Checks for Payment, 78 BANKING L.I. 650-51(1961).
2"2Spokane Valley State Bank v. Lutes, 133 Wash. 66, 233 Pac. 308 (1925);
Morris-Miller Co. v. Von Pressentin, 63 Wash. 74, 114 Pac. 912 (1911).
UCC §§ 3-504,4-204.
'"Codd v. Von Der Abe, 92 Wash. 529, 159 Pac. 686 (1916) ; Benedict v. Schmieg,
13 Wash. 476, 43 Pac. 374 (1896), 36 L.R.A. 703.
"435 Wn. 2d 883, 215 P.2d 877 (1950).
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tainly, that an attorney has authority to accept or pay. On the other
hand, parol evidence could be used to establish that authority and
thus justify the presentment.246
Paragraph (4) is consistent with other sections of the Code respect-
ing the presentment of instruments payable at a bank. Though under
the Washington version247 the fact that an instrument is payable at
a bank is not equivalent to an authorization on the bank to pay, other
sections demonstrate that such domiciling of the paper may have the
effect of tender.24 s Further, unless presentment is made at the bank,
loss caused by the bank's failure will lodge with the holder. 49
Section 3-505. Rights of Party to Whom Presentment is Made.
(1) The party to whom presentment is made may without dishonor
require
(a) exhibition of the instrument; and
(b) reasonable identification of the person making presentment
and evidence of his authority to make it if made for another;
and
(c) that the instrument be produced for acceptance or payment
at a place specified in it, or if there be none at any place
reasonable in the circumstances; and
(d) a signed receipt on the instrument for any partial or full
payment and its surrender upon full payment.
(2) Failure to comply with any such requirement invalidates the
presentment but the person presenting has a reasonable time in
which to comply and the time for acceptance or payment runs
from the time of compliance.
The provisions stated here are necessary to establish limits on the
otherwise loose requirements imposed for presentment in the previous
section. In the parlance of the NIL, by contrast, these specific rights
of the obligor were stated as absolute requirements to be met in all
cases, not merely when demanded by the payor or obligor. Certainly a
payor must demand surrender of the document on payment of the
principal sum and notation of any partial payments of principal. For
that matter, payments of interest, too, should be noted. Any present-
SBy analogy to UCC § 3-403.
u"UCC § 3-121.
UCC §§ 3-501, 3-502, 3-604(3).
UCC § 3-502.
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ment, thus, ought to be met with a requirement of display of the
instrument, but the holder is given a second chance if he cannot
comply. The question whether presentment by telephone is permissible
has been adverted to in the discussion of the previous section, but
is relevant here also. Certainly it would not be effective if the obligor
asserts his rights under this section, and probably is not effective
even though such demand is not made. 50
Section 3-506. Time Allowed for Acceptance or Payment.
(1) Acceptance may be deferred without dishonor until the close
of the next business day following presentment. The holder
may also in a good faith effort to obtain acceptance and without
either dishonor of the instrument or discharge of secondary
parties allow postponement of acceptance for an additional
business day.
(2) Except as a longer time is allowed in the case of documentary
drafts drawn under a letter of credit, and unless an earlier time
is agreed to by the party to pay, payment of an instrument may
be deferred without dishonor pending reasonable examination
to determine whether it is properly payable, but payment must
be made in any event before the close of business on the day of
presentment.
The matters covered in this section have not been the subject of
reported Washington decisions. The Official Comments, comparing
the Code and the NIL, are thus indicative of the changes worked in
Washington.
One observation seems necessary concerning the effect of retention
of an instrument by a drawee beyond the stated period. Such retention
is not, absent a demand for return, a conversion.25 Nor is it here
described as an acceptance; thus, it seems to amount to a dishonor
of the instrument.2 52 However, because of section 4-302, a payor bank
will become accountable for an item retained too long. This requires
that the payor bank settle for the instrument by midnight of the day
of receipt and, further, that it pay or return the item by midnight
of the following day. The effect of this accountability on the liability
of indorsers seems unclear.2 53
See the discussion at text accompanying note 239.
UCC § 3-419.UCC § 3-507.
If the payor bank has made a provisional settlement and fails to act within its
[ VOL. 43 : 499
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-ARTICLE 3
Section 3-507. Dishonor; Holder's Right of Recourse; Term
Allowing Re-Presentment
(1) An instrument is dishonored when
(a) a necessary or optional presentment is duly made and due
acceptance or payment is refused or cannot be obtained
within the prescribed time or in case of bank collections the
instrument is seasonably returned by the midnight deadline
(Section 4-301); or
(b) presentment is excused and the instrument is not duly ac-
cepted or paid.
(2) Subject to any necessary notice of dishonor and protest, the
holder has upon dishonor an immediate right of recourse
against the drawers and indorsers.
(3) Return of an instrument for lack of proper indorsement is not
dishonor.
(4) A term in a draft or an indorsement thereof allowing a stated
time for re-presentment in the event of any dishonor of the
draft by nonacceptance if a time draft or by nonpayment if a
sight draft gives the holder as against any secondary party
bound by the term an option to waive the dishonor without
affecting the liability of the secondary party and he may pre-
sent again up to the end of the stated time.
In the discussion of the previous section, mention was made of the
effect of failing to give an acceptance within the times specified therein.
This section clearly states that these circumstances amount to a dis-
honor of the instrument, the view of the Washington court under the
NIL. The consequence is that the presenter must take whatever steps
are necessary, after dishonor, to hold secondary parties.2 5 The effect
of certain provisions of article 4 has been discussed in connection
with section 3-506.
There seems to have been no Washington decision respecting the
other details of this section.
midnight deadline, the drawer and indorsers seem to be discharged because this
equates to final payment under UCC § 4-213. See CLanRY., BAmEY & YouNG, BANIK
DEPosrrS AND COLLECrIONS 77 (1959). No express provision has been discovered for
the circumstance in which no provisional credit is given within the requirement of
UCC § 4-202 that the payor settle by midnight of the day of receipt.
" Ostrander v. Yokohama Specie Bank, 153 Wash. 427, 279 Pac. 585 (1929).
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Section 3-508. Notice of Dishonor.
(1) Notice of dishonor may be given to any person who may be
liable on the instrument by or on behalf of the holder or any
party who has himself received notice, or any other party who
can be compelled to pay the instrument. In addition an agent
or bank in whose hands the instrument is dishonored may give
notice to his principal or customer or to another agent or bank
from which the instrument was received.
(2) Any necessary notice must be given by a bank before its mid-
night deadline, and by any other person before midnight of
the third business day after dishonor or receipt of notice of
dishonor.
(3) Notice may be given in any reasonable manner. It may be oral
or written and in any terms which identify the instrument and
state that it has been dishonored. A misdescription which does
not mislead the party notified does not vitiate the notice.
Sending the instrument bearing a stamp, ticket or writing
stating that acceptance or payment has been refused or sending
a notice of debit with respect to the instrument is sufficient.
(4) Written notice is given when sent although it is not received.
(5) Notice to one partner is notice to each although the firm has
been dissolved.
(6) When any party is in insolvency proceedings instituted after
the issue of the instrument notice may be given either to the
party or to the representative of his estate.
(7) When any party is dead or incompetent notice may be sent to
his .last known address or given to his personal representative.
(8) Notice operates for the benefit of all parties who have rights
on the instrument against the party notified.
The penalty for failure to give notice to a secondary party, it will
be recalled, is absolute discharge of indorsers 5 and a limited discharge
of drawers.251 Subsection (1) identifies the parties who may give the
required notice. As was true under the NIL257 the notice once given
operates for the benefit of all parties on the instrument who have
rights against the party notified. There is, thus, no requirement of
-UCC §§ 3-501, 3-502. Black v. Emporium Dry Goods Co., 129 Wash. 100, 224
Pac. 591 (1924).
UCC § 3-502.
NIL §§ 92, 93 [WASH. REv. CODE §§ 62.01.092, .093 (1955)].
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duplication of notices by each party who may be in a position to
recover from a prior party.
In stating the time required for effective notice, paragraph (2)
distinguishes between banks and other persons, the former being
required to act more promptly than the latter. The rules here stated
are much less complex and less onerous than those of the NIL.258
Particularly troublesome have been the cases involving installment
notes, notes bearing interest payable in installments, and notes with
acceleration clauses. If an indorser is to be held to make good any
part of the instrument, principal or interest, he must receive notice
within the stated time after the nonpayment thereof.259 If the holder
elects to accelerate, notice must be given within the prescribed time
after he accelerates. 260 There is no stated time limit on the exercise
of the power to accelerate, so presumably this power may be exercised
within a reasonable time after the accelerating event, and in one case
this was as long as seventy days.26 1 All of these time limits, it must
be remembered, apply to the first notice given. Once that notice is
given, the person so notified has a similar length of time to notify
parties liable to him.
The mechanism for notice is not elaborate, as a reading of paragraph
(3) of the section demonstrates. Somewhat capriciously, it would
seem from the obligor's point of view, the Code retains the NIL's
rule that notice is effective when mailed, even though it is not in fact
delivered.26 2 One would expect a court to be on the look-out for
loop-holes, and if there were any demonstrated fault in the mailing
or addressing, the notice would not be effective. This may account
for Benedict v. Schmieg,263 in which a notice mailed without mention-
ing the street address of the recipient was held ineffective. Surely
the size of the town is a factor to be weighed.
Paragraphs (5) (6) and (7) simplify the requirements for notifying
one who may be said to serve in a representative capacity. Although
these provisions are couched in simpler language and in language
containing less detail, the substantive principles at work were recog-
nized by specific NIL provisions.264
NIL §§ 102-04 [WAsH. REv. CODE §§ 62.01.102-.104 (1955)).
Chamberlain v. Cobb, 129 Wash. 549, 225 Pac. 414 (1924).
Anderson v. Sperry, 155 Wash. 300, 284 Pac. 102 (1930).
'Wagner v. Benjamin, 120 Wash. 532, 207 Pac. 1045 (1922).
1' NIL § 105 [WAsH. REv. CODE § 62.01.105 (1955)1.
13 Wash. 476, 43 Pac. 374 (1896), 36 L.R.A 703.
- NIL §§ 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 [WAsH. REV. CODE §§ 62.01.097, .098, .099, .100, .101
(1955)].
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Section 3-509. Protest; Noting for Protest.
(1) A protest is a certificate of dishonor made under the hand and
seal of a United States consul or vice consul or a notary public
or other person authorized to certify dishonor by the law of the
place where dishonor occurs. It may be made upon inform-
ation satisfactory to such person.
(2) The protest must identify the instrument and certify either that
due presentment has been made or the reason why it is excused
and that the instrument has been dishonored by nonacceptance
or nonpayment.
(3) The protest may also certify that notice of dishonor has been
given to all parties or to specified parties.
(4) Subject to subsection (5) any necessary protest is due by the
time that notice of dishonor is due.
(5) If, before protest is due, an instrument has been noted for
protest by the officer to make protest, the protest may be made
at any time thereafter as of the date of the noting.
The word "protest" in the parlance of the law of negotiable instru-
ments has a very narrow meaning, as this section makes clear. There
appears to be a usage extending the meaning of protest to include all
of the steps constituting conditions precedent to the liability of second-
ary parties.6 5 Of course, this usage will not modify the express
provisions of the statute. However, a formal protest might well be
effective as a notice of dishonor, if the circumstances showing the
dishonor are stated.
Details of the differences between pre-Code law and the Code's
provision are stated adequately in the Official Comments.
Section 3-510. Evidence of Dishonor and Notice of Dishonor.
The following are admissible as evidence and create a presump-
tion of dishonor and of any notice of dishonor therein shown:
(a) a document regular in form as provided in the preceding sec-
tion which purports to be a protest;
(b) the purported stamp or writing of the drawee, payor bank or
presenting bank on the instrument or accompanying it stat-
ing that acceptance or payment has been refused for reasons
consistent with dishonor;
'SMaury v. Winlock & Toledo Logging Ry., 148 Wash. 572, 269 Pac. 815 (1928).
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(c) any book or record of the drawee, payor bank, or any collect-
ing bank kept in the usual course of business which shows
dishonor, even though there is no evidence of who made the
entry.
This section is, of course, without prior statutory counterpart. Sub-
sections (b) and (c) permit less formal evidence of nonpayment and
notice than has heretofore been possible. The first subsection would
seem to remove the problem posed in Maury v. Winlock & Toledo
Logging & Ry.,206 where a plaintiff had alleged protest, but not notice
of dishonor. The evidence showed a protest stating that formal
notices had been sent, which was held sufficient to admit evidence
about presentment, notice of dishonor and the like. The decision
assumes that the burden of presenting this evidence rests with the
plaintiff; under the Code, however, the protest form would raise a
presumption of dishonor and notice (stated in the protest) to be over-
come by the opposite party.
Section 3-511. Waived or Excused Presentment, Protest or Notice
of Dishonor or Delay Therein.
(1) Delay in presentment, protest or notice of dishonor is excused
when the party is without notice that it is due or when the
delay is caused by circumstances beyond his control and he
exercises reasonable diligence after the cause of the delay
ceases to operate.
(2) Presentment or notice or protest as the case may be is entirely
excused when
(a) the party to be charged has waived it expressly or by implica-
cation either before or after it is due; or
(b) such party has himself dishonored the instrument or has
countermanded payment or otherwise has no reason to ex-
pect or right to require that the instrument be accepted or
paid; or
(c) by reasonable diligence the presentment or protest cannot be
be made or the notice given.
(3) Presentment is also entirely excused when
(a) the maker, acceptor or drawee of any instrument except a
25!bid.
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documentary draft is dead or in insolvency proceedings
instituted after the issue of the instrument; or
(b) acceptance or payment is refused but not for want of proper
presentment.
(4) Where a draft has been dishonored by nonacceptance a later
presentment for payment and any notice of dishonor and pro-
test for nonpayment are excused unless in the meantime the
instrument has been accepted.
(5) A waiver of protest is also a waiver of presentment and of notice
of dishonor even though protest is not required.
(6) Where a waiver of presentment or notice or protest is embodied
in the instrument itself it is binding upon all parties; but where
it is written above the signature of an indorser it binds him
only.
A threshold question is presented by this section: Where lies the
burden of proof with respect to the matters enumerated herein? This
question, indeed, is pertinent to all of Part 5 of article 3, and the
answer is only inferentially derivable from the Code. By section
3-307, production of an instrument entitles a holder to recover "unless
the defendant establishes a defense." If non-presentment, failure of
notice of dishonor or lack of protest is thought of as a defense, the
burden would seem to rest on the defendant, obligor, to prove non-
compliance with those conditions. The rule has been well established
to the contrary, however, in pre-Code law. The plaintiff, holder, is
required to allege and prove compliance with the conditions precedent
to defendant's liability.267 The Code, it is believed, does not change
this rule. The defenses referred to in section 3-307 are contractual
defenses to liability, not failure to perform conditions precedent to
that liability. Thus, the plaintiff (holder) must establish that the
conditions have been met, or that they are excused by this section,
before he may recover. The wording of Official Comment 5 to the
presently discussed section supports this conclusion in stating: "The
excuse is established only by proof that reasonable diligence has been
exercised without success .... ." Were the burden otherwise located,
this phrasing would not be accurate.
'Fick v. Jones, 185 Wash. 365, 55 P.2d 334 (1936); Galbraith v. Shepard, 43
Wash. 698, 86 Pac. 1113 (1906) ; Bay View Brewing Co. v. Grubb, 24 Wash. 163,
63 Pac. 1091 (1901).
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The distinction between delay in presentment, stated in paragraph
(1), and non-presentment, stated in paragraph (2), is very hard to
identify. The thought is, of course, that the circumstances justifying
delay are of limited duration, but the factual patterns establishing
this kind of circumstances may be hard to distinguish from those
presenting a permanent inability. The problem existed under the
NIL also.2 68
Whether a particular holder has been excused temporarily or perm-
anently from the need for presentment, notice or protest is a question
of fact. Mere inconvenience will not permanently excuse, although
a temporary substantial inconvenience might permit delay. The dis-
tance separating the holder from the place of payment, coupled with
some hardship in making the trip, will not excuse presentment. 29 Nor
is presentment shown to have been excused merely for the reason that
the maker's whereabouts are unknown, unless the holder can demon-
strate that he made some reasonable effort to locate the maker or to
present the instrument at his usual place of business or residence.
If presentment is made at such a place and neither the party to accept
nor anyone authorized to accept for him is present, presentment is
excused.2 7 1
Waiver will dispense entirely with presentment, notice or protest.
While a waiver of protest is also a waiver of presentment and notice
of dishonor,2 72 a waiver of notice of dishonor does not waive present-
ment.27 3 An automatic acceleration clause does not have the effect
of a waiver of notice; 274 f ortiori an optional clause would not have
this effect.
The waiver may come about by conduct after maturity. Thus, in
Cowles v. Matthews,275 a drawer or indorser who, with full knowledge
of the holder's neglect in presentment, promised nonetheless to pay,
was held liable. No consideration is necessary for such a promise.
BRIToN, BILLS AND NoTEs § 189 (2d ed. 1961).
Hunt v. Panhandle Lumber Co., 66 Wash. 645, 120 Pac. 538 (1912) (mail could
have been used).
'
0 Aisted v. Grim, 35 Wn. 2d 883, 215 P.2d 877 (1950); Wagner v. Benjamin,
120 Wash. 532, 207 Pac. 1045 (1922).
- UCC § 3-504(2) (c). See Ostrander v. Yokohama Specie Bank, 153 Wash. 427,
279 Pac. 585 (1929).
'UCC §3-511(5); Wilkie v. Chandon, 1 Wash. 355, 25 Pac. 464 (1890).
'Cowles v. Matthews, 179 Wash. 154, 36 P.2d 537 (1934). The cases, however,
are in conflict. BarroN, BILLS AND Nomas 532 (2d ed. 1961).
='Clausen v. Forehand, 152 Wash. 310, 277 Pac. 827 (1929).
-' 179 Wash. 154, 36 P.2d 537 (1934).
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A provision of the NIL reads: "Presentment for payment is not
required in order to charge an indorser where the instrument was
made or accepted for his accommodation and he has no reason to
expect that the instrument will be paid if presented. 2 76 This section
was misconstrued in one famous case, because the word "accepted"
was read in a lay sense, rather than in its technical sense.277 Subse-
quent decisions corrected this error. The important portion of the
NIL is restated by the Code: if the party has no reason to expect
that an instrument will be accepted or paid, he is not entitled to have
presentment made. This last sentence would, if literally followed,
mean that in the case of a maker's insolvency, known to an indorser,
the indorser could not expect payment to be made, and thus present-
ment would seem to be excused. The rule, however, is otherwise.7 9
On the other hand, if insolvency proceedings involving the maker
have been instituted after execution of the note, presentment is ex-
cused.28 °
Paragraph (6) is a restatement of pre-existing law.2 ' There seems
to be less room for dispute when the waiver is in the body of the
instrument,8 2 than where it appears on the back of the instrument.
The Code retains the NIL rule that a waiver before a particular
indorser's signature binds him only. The solution thus given is possibly
too glib to be helpful, for the form of the waiver may well be control-
ling. For example, if the waiver indorsed on the back of an instrument
were in terms: "The following indorsers waive .... ", it would certainly
be effective to bind all indorsers below the language. Indeed, the use
of the plural might be enough to extend the waiver beyond the imme-
diate signer.2"3
" NIL § 80 [WASH. REV. CODE § 62.01.080 (1955)].
'Fosdick v. Government Mineral Springs Hotel Co., 115 Wash. 127, 196 Pac.
652 (1921).
'Legal Discount Corp. v. Martin Hardware Co., 199 Wash. 476, 91 P.2d 1010
(1939), 15 WASH. L. REv. 54 (1940).
' Black v. Emporium Dry Goods Co., 129 Wash. 100, 224 Pac. 591 (1924). There
are two contrary decisions: Gleeson v. Lichty, 62 Wash. 656, 114 Pac. 518 (1911) ;
Fosdick v. Government Mineral Springs Hotel Co., 115 Wash. 127, 196 Pac. 652
(1921). The latter case involved insolvency of the maker at the time the note was
executed, which the Washington court seems to treat differently from supervening
insolvency. The former decision may be accountable to the fact that the indorser,
whose liability was in issue, was an officer of the insolvent corporate maker.
°UCC §3-511 (3) (a).
NIL § 110 [WASH. REv. CODE § 62.01.110 (1955)].
12'As in Furth v. Baxter, 24 Wash. 608, 64 Pac. 798 (1901).
'Loveday v. Anderson, 18 Wash. 322, 51 Pac. 463 (1897). This pre-NIL deci-
sion may, however, be explained as one on which the NIL took a contrary approach.
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PART 6. DISCHARGE
Section 3-601. Discharge of Parties.
(1) The extent of the discharge of any party from liability on an
instrument is governed by the sections on
(a) payment or satisfaction (Section 3-603); or
(b) tender of payment (Section 3-604); or
(c) cancellation or renunciation (Section 3-605); or
(d) impairment of right of recourse or of collateral (Section
3-606); or
(e) reacquisition of the instrument by a prior party (Section
3-208); or
(f) fraudulent and material alteration (Section 3-407); or
(g) certification of a check (Section 3-411); or
(h) acceptance varying a draft (Section 3412); or
(i) unexcused delay in presentment or notice of dishonor or
protest (Section 3-502).
(2) Any party is also discharged from his liablility on an instrument
to another party by any other act or agreement with such party
which would discharge his simple contract for the payment of
money.
(3) The liability of all parties is discharged when any party who has
himself no right of action or recourse on the instrument
(a) reacquires the instrument in his own right; or
(b) is discharged under any provision of the Article, except as
otherwise provided with respect to discharge for impair-
ment of recourse or of collateral (Section 3-606).
Paragraph (1) is merely a catalog or index of the circumstances in
which liability on an instrument may be discharged. The details
involved in the particular means of discharge are discussed in connec-
tion with the governing Code section.
Paragraph (2) retains the rule of the NIL, by which an act or
agreement which would discharge liability on a simple contract will
discharge liability on a negotiable instrument. Release of one of
several makers of a note may fall within this rule.2"4 If the maker
"Pacific Southwest Trust & Say. Bank v. Mayer, 138 Wash. 85, 244 Pac. 248
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who is released is an accommodation party, however, and this is known
to the releasor, another section becomes operative. 285 An agreement
surrendering a note in consideration of a new undertaking would have
the effect of discharging the note, if the new undertaking was actually
performed or agreed to,286 but not if the new arrangement is not
finalized. 87 Liability on a note may, of course, be merged into a
judgment, and this would be effective under paragraph (2) of the
Code's provision; but judgment against a maker will not discharge
an indorser2 88 nor does a judgment against one co-maker bar action
against another who was not within the jurisdiction. 289 These illustra-
tions are samples of the kinds of things that may discharge liability
on simple contracts. They are not intended to be an exhaustive list
of such matters.
The third paragraph of this section is a simplification and clarifica-
tion of prior law. To be observed is that the discharge stated therein
is effective if one who has no right to recover on an instrument either
(a) reacquires it, or (b) is discharged. In a typical situation, this
person will be a maker, but if the maker is an accommodation maker,
someone else will bear ultimate responsibility. In such a case, the
maker's payment will not discharge the liability of the person accom-
modated. 9 '
If the maker acquires the instrument prior to maturity, there is
still a possibility of liability on his part if he renegotiates the paper 291
or if by chance it reaches the hands of a holder in due course.292 A
somewhat different problem arises if the paper is returned to one of
several co-makers and he thereafter reissues it. Though his liability
is clear, it is doubtful whether the co-makers are liable to one knowing
the circumstances.293
(1926); North Pacific Mortgage Co. v. Krewson, 129 Wash. 239, 224 Pac. 566 (1924),
53 A.L.R. 1415; cf. Johnson v. Stewart, 1 Wn. 2d 439, 96 P.2d 473 (1939) (where
intention was shown to release only some but not all of the co-makers, the rule of the
Krewson case does not apply). See 4 CoRBIN, CONTRAcTS § 931 (1951).
UCC § 3-306.
Washington Seminary of the Church of the United Brethren in Christ v.
Hunt, 45 Wash. 571, 88 Pac. 1034 (1907).
' Shuey v. Adair, 18 Wash. 188, 51 Pac. 388 (1897), 39 L.R.A. 473.
Petri v. Manny, 99 Wash. 601, 170 Pac. 127 (1918), 1 A.L.R. 1595.
' Bradley Engr & Mfg. Co. v. Heyburn, 56 Wash. 628, 106 Pac. 170 (1910).
'Downie v. Cooledge, 48 Wn. 2d 485, 294 P.2d 926 (1956) (although here the
instrument was paid and reacquired by an indorser) ; Pease v. Syler, 78 Wash. 24,
138 Pac. 310 (1914).
='State Fin. Co. v. Moore, 103 Wash. 298, 174 Pac. 22 (1918).
=' UCC § 3-602.
First Nat'l Bank v. Harris, 7 Wash. 139, 34 Pac. 466 (1893).
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Section 3-602. Effect of Discharge Against Holder in Due Course.
No discharge of any party provided by this Article is effective
against a subsequent holder in due course unless he has notice
thereof when he takes the instrument.
Although the NIL did not have a general provision respecting the
personal nature of the discharge,29 4 it seems not to have been doubted
that discharges worked by that statute were not effective against due
course holders. The Washington decisions illustrating this involve pay-
ment. If the payor does not demand surrender of the instrument
(if it is not overdue) or demand notation of payments on the instru-
ment, his payment will not discharge him as to a due course holder.295
The provisions of this section exclude the operation of discharges
accomplished outside the Code, as by bankruptcy of one or more of
the parties.
Section 3-603. Payment or Satisfaction.
(1) The liability of any party is discharged to the extent of his pay-
ment or satisfaction to the holder even though it is made with
knowledge of a claim of another person to the instrunent
unless prior to such payment or satisfaction the person making
the claim either supplies indemnity deemed adequate by the
party seeking the discharge or enjoins payment or satisfaction
by order of a court of competent jurisdiction in an action in
which the adverse claimant and the holder are parties. This
subsection does not, however, result in the discharge of the
liability
(a) of a party who in bad faith pays or satisfies a holder who
acquired the instrument by theft or who (unless having the
rights of a holder in due course) holds through one who so
acquired it; or
" NIL § 122 [WASn. REV. CODE § 62.01.122 (1955)] did stipulate that renunciation
did not affect the rights of due course holders.
'Kopple v. Bugge, 168 Wash. 182, 11 P.2d 236 (1932) ; Kelley v. Bausman, 98
Wash. 686, 168 Pac. 181 (1917) ; Carr v. Jones, 29 Wash. 78, 69 Pac. 646 (1902) ;
Commercial Bank v. Toklas, 21 Wash. 36, 56 Pac. 927 (1899) ; Merrill v. Muzzy, 11
Wash. 16, 39 Pac. 277 (1895) (reasoning predicated on the assumption that payment
is only a personal defense) ; Dewing v. Crueger, 7 Wash. 590, 35 Pac. 393 (1894).
In Reardan v. Cockrell, 54 Wash. 400, 103 Pac. 457 (1909), 50 L.R.A. (N.S.) 87, the
doctrine seems to have been extended so as to protect one who, because he purchased
after maturity, was not a due course holder. The case ought not be followed. See
Chafee, Rights in Overdue Paper, 31 HARv. L. REv. 1104, 1123 n.56 (1918).
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(b) of a party (other than an intermediary bank or a payor bank
which is not a depositary bank) who pays or satisfies the
holder of an instrument which has been restrictively in-
dorsed in a manner not consistent with the terms of such
restrictive indorsement.
(2) Payment or satisfaction may be made with the consent of the
holder by any person including a stranger to the instrument.
Surrender of the instrument to such a person gives him the
rights of a transferee (Section 3-201).
Paragraph (1) brings together many facets of the mechanism. and
effect of payment. The payor is discharged to the extent of his pay-
ment or satisfaction to the holder. 96 This means, first of all, that
payments of a portion of the principal sum discharge only pro tanto.
Thus, in a very early case, a note calling for payment of 1000 dollars,
with a collateral agreement that it would be valued at 500 dollars
"in coin," was held not totally discharged by payment of 500 dollars
in currency.297 The issue of the effectiveness of an "accord and
satisfaction" on paying less than an owed debt is not covered by this
section of the Code, and is thus left to general law. 9s The leading
case involving a note appears to be Baldwin v. Daly,99 which an-
nounces: "And while it is true that courts have disagreed on the
question whether the payment of a part of a debt is a sufficient
consideration to support an agreement for the release of the whole, this
court has taken part with the courts holding such contracts to be
founded on a sufficient consideration . . . ." The reliability of this
sweeping statement, however, is suspect, and the Washington view is
anything but clear. °°
The Code principle also requires payment to the holder. A substan-
tial amount of litigation, however, has been involved with payments
to other persons claimed to be agents of the holder. The major issues
in such cases are entirely factual: did or did not the circumstances,
interpreted by custom and usage, show authority to receive the pay-
' A payee who has received payment cannot collect a second time. Sutherland v.
Pallister, 50 Wash. 552, 97 Pac. 745 (1908).
' Westbrook v. Chapman, 1 Wash. Terr. 227 (1867).
UCC § 1-103.
'41 Wash. 416, 419, 83 Pac. 724, 725 (1906).
'Shattuck, Cmtracts in Washington, 1937-1957, 34 WAsH. L. REv. 24, 56
(1959) ; Note, Contracts, 30 WASH. L. REv. 93, 104 (1955) ; Quigley, The Doctrine
of Foakes v. Beer in Washington, 16 WAsH. L. RFv. 42 (1941).
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ment?3 °1 A closely related issue involves payment to the holder under
circumstances in which the holder is subject to another's claim. Cer-
tainly a payment made without knowledge of that claim is protected.302
Note that under the Code, the payment is protected even if it is made
with knowledge of the third party claim, with certain exceptions. This
provision is in substantial accord with the policy of a 1961 statutory
enactment regarding adverse claims against banks.
30 3
Many are the factual disputes whether payment or satisfaction has
been accomplished. 304 The burden of proof rests with the party claim-
ing payment, for this is an "affirmative defense." 0 5 The payment
may be in money, property or services. 06 Whether a renewal note
"pays" or discharges an earlier, original note seems to be a matter
determined by the parties' intention. 07 The controlling principle re-
garding what an agent is authorized to accept in payment is, at least
for collecting banks, stated elsewhere.3 08
The Code has no provisions governing the application of payments,
so common law principles will control. 09 Nor is there a provision
respecting the time at which payment is effectuated, so the Washington
" Smith v. Keating, 52 Wn. 2d 391, 326 P.2d 60 (1958) ; Bjorkstam v. Federal
Land Bank, 138 Wash. 456, 244 Pac. 981 (1926) ; Burtt v. Schoening, 138 Wash. 187,
244 Pac. 381 (1926); First Nat'l Bank v. Hessell, 133 Wash. 643, 234 Pac. 662
(1925); Delaney v. Nelson, 132 Wash. 472, 232 Pac. 292 (1925) ; Canadian Bank of
Commerce v. Sesnon Co., 68 Wash. 434, 123 Pac. 602 (1912); Warnock v. Itawis,
38 Wash. 144, 80 Pac. 297 (1905); Davis v. Erickson, 3 Wash. 654, 29 Pac. 86
(1892). Cf. Bayley v. Hamburg, 106 Wash. 177, 179 Pac. 88 (1919) (payment under
an indorsement forged by payee's agent discharged the payor, where the proceeds
actually reached the payee).
'" Doucette v. Old Natl Bank & Union Trust Co., 161 Wash. 159, 296 Pac. 570(1931) ; cf. Woodworth v. School Dist. No. 2, 92 Wash. 456, 159 Pac. 757 (1916) ;
Woodworth v. School Dist. No. 2, 103 Wash. 677, 175 Pac. 321 (1918) (may have
followed the principle announced in the statute cited in the following footnote).
I WAsH. REv. CODE§ 30.20.090 (1961).
'Peterson v. Schoonover, 42 Wn. 2d 621,. 257 P.2d 209 (1953); Wallin v.
Carlson, 150 Wash. 294, 272 Pac. 731 (1928) ; Barron v. Robinson, 67 Wash. 656, 122
Pac. 343 (1912), are illustrative.
'Federal Rubber Co. v. M. M. Stewart Co., 180 Wash. 625, 41 P.2d 158 (1935);
Creditors Ass'n v. Fry, 179 Wash. 339, 37 P.2d 688 (1934) ; Hanson v. Moses Inv.
Co., 103 Wash. 218, 174 Pac. 25 (1918) ; Bingham v. Domer, 94 Wash. 253, 162 Pac.
355 (1917) ; Clark v. Eltinge, 29 Wash. 215, 69 Pac. 736 (1902). That proof of pay-
ment is often a tricky business see Russo-Chinese Bank v. National Bank of Com-
merce, 187 Fed. 80 (9th Cir. 1911); 206 Fed. 646 (9th Cir. 1913), aff'd, 213 Fed. 633
(9th Cir. 1914), aff'd 241 U.S. 403 (1916).
'Northern Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Casey, 143 Wash. 596, 255 Pac. 659 (1927);
Blaser v. Meeker, 125 Wash. 379, 216 Pac. 1 (1923); Burnham v. Rowley, 111 Wash.
656, 191 Pac. 811 (1920).
"I Boston Nat'l Bank v. Jose, 10 Wash. 185, 38 Pac. 1026 (1894); 3 PATON'S
DIGEST 2948 (1944).
'UCC § 4-211. See Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Lyon, 179 Wash. 673, 38 P.2d
1029 (1934).
'UCC §1-103. See Associated Indem. Corp. v. Del Guzzo, 195 Wash. 486, 81
P.2d 516 (1938) ; Diettrich Bros. v. Anderson, 183 Wash. 574, 48 P.2d 921 (1935).
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view will continue to be that in the case of mailed payments, it is
receipt not dispatch that signals payment."'
Paragraph (2) is a new provision, extending the concept of "pay-
ment for honor," a matter on which no Washington decisions have
been found.
Section 3-604. Tender of Payment.
(1) Any party making tender of full payment to a holder when or
after it is due is discharged to the extent of all subsequent
liability for interest, costs and attorney's fees.
(2) The holder's refusal of such tender wholly discharges any party
who has a right of recourse against the party making the tender.
(3) Where the maker or acceptor of an instrument payable other-
wise than on demand is able and ready to pay at every place
of payment specified in the instrument when it is due, it is
equivalent to tender.
The rule stated in subsection (1) has been effective in Washington
for some time.31' To be observed is the requirement that the tender
be of the full amount due. This seems to be the rule announced in
Washington," 2 although there are two cases difficult to accommodate
to the rule. In Ward v. Thorndyke, 13 a debtor tendered part cash and
the balance in the form of a ninety-day note. The holding was that
this tender, when refused, terminated the liability for interest only
as to the cash amount. It would appear that a proper tender would
have required tender in cash of the full amount, so no tender at all
was accomplished.31 4 In Matzger v. Page,315 an argument was made
that failure to tender the interest due upon the accrued interest for
three days intervening between maturity and the date of tender ren-
dered the tender ineffectual. The argument was rejected as too trifling.
Such a holding is questionable, for the creditor seems entitled to the
full amount of his claim, unless he is estopped by his conduct. 6
310 Weatherwax v. Johnson, 161 Wash. 80, 296 Pac. 182 (1931).
... Northern Bank & Trust Co. v. Slater, Watt & Co., 123 Wash. 528, 212 Pac.
1063 (1923).
"
2Kleeb v. McInturff, 71 Wash. 419, 128 Pac. 1076 (1912); Loveday v. Parker,
50 Wash. 260, 97 Pac. 62 (1908); Kirkland Land & Improvement Co. v. Jones. 18
Wash. 407, 51 Pac. 1043 (1898).
"65 Wash. 11, 117 Pac. 593 (1911).
"UCC § 2-511(2).
"' 62 Wash. 170, 113 Pac. 254 (1911).
"
1
'Zeimantz v. Blake, 39 Wash. 6, 80 Pac. 822 (1905).
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The problem of the amount to be tendered is, admittedly, very
difficult when tender is made after maturity. Since a quick determin-
ation of the interest due may produce error, it is difficult for the
creditor to make an immediate decision whether to accept the amount
tendered. If the tender is intended to discharge an obligation on an
instrument containing an acceleration clause, another factor enters in.
Must the tender be of the full amount as accelerated, or only of the
overdue amount? The answer will depend upon whether the holder
has accelerated the instrument, for if he has not, only the amount
overdue need be tendered. 17
Paragraph (2) is a redraft of an NIL provision3 18 not litigated in
this state. Paragraph (3) involves the effect of domiciled paper. The
requirement of presentment at the place of payment in case of instru-
ments payable at a bank has been discussed elsewhere.319
Section 3-605. Cancellation and Renunciation.
(1) The holder of an instrument may even without consideration
discharge any party
(a) in any manner apparent on the face of the instrument or the
indorsement, as by intentionally cancelling the instrument
or the party's signature by destruction or mutilation, or by
striking out the party's signature; or
(b) by renouncing his rights by a writing signed and delivered
or by surrender of the instrument to the party to be dis-
charged.
(2) Neither cancellation nor renunciation without surrender of the
instrument affects the title thereto.
This section consolidates two methods by which liability on an
instrument may be discharged: (1) cancellation and (2) renunciation.
The pre-Code statutory counterparts were not thus amalgamated, but
the result is essentially the same as it was in pre-Code law.
Unfortunately, the Washington decisions, beginning with Baldwin
v. Daly,320 appear to have misconstrued the NIL's provisions respect-
'7 Weinberg v. Naher, 51 Wash. 591, 99 Pac. 736 (1909).
NIL § 120 (4).
See discussion under UCC §§ 3-501, 3-502, 3-504.
'41 Wash. 416, 83 Pac. 724 (1906). See also Morlar v. Schultz, 153 Wash. 51,
279 Pac. 105 (1929) ; Kuhn v. Groll, 118 Wash. 285, 203 Pac. 44 (1922) ; Pitt v.
Little, 58 Wash. 355, 108 Pac. 941 (1910), 23 YALE L.J. 313 (1914). The requirements
imposed by NIL § 122 [WASH. REv. CODE § 62.01.122 (1955)], counterpart to a portion
of UCC § 3-605, were held applicable only to valid instruments. Thus an oral rescis-
sion was effective on an instrument executed without consideration. Homburg v.
Larson, 93 Wash. 74, 160 Pac. 11 (1916).
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ing renunciation. In essence, the error made was in the assumption
that the requirements stated for renunciation are broadly applicable
to all releases. Thus, an oral release sustained by consideration, as in
an accord and satisfaction, has been held ineffective. It will be recalled
that a person's liability on a negotiable instrument may be discharged
by "any ... act or agreement ... which would discharge his simple
contract for the payment of the money." '' Novations and releases
for consideration 322 are to be subsumed under this provision, and are
not affected by the formalistic requirements for gratuitous renuncia-
tion or cancellation stated in UCC section 3-605.323
The Code retains the wording of the NIL that it is the holder
who may renounce or cancel. A release by a former holder, thus, will
not be effective.32 14  Under the NIL, as discussed in the preceding
paragraph, the Washington rule erroneously interpreted the require-
ment of a writing very broadly, applying it to releases supported by
consideration. This rule, however, was not applied to releases by
persons other than the holder. 32 5 An oral release, supported by con-
sideration, by such a person was, therefore, valid. It will be valid
under the Code by virtue of UCC section 3-601(2).
A holder may renounce his rights against some, but not all, of the
persons liable on an instrument. The effect of such conduct on the
liability of other parties is governed by another Code section.326
The Code makes clear that an unintentional cancellation does not
result in discharging the liability of parties to an instrument.3 27 It is
less precise in dealing with the effect of surrender of the instrument,
but a gloss has already been put on this section by a judicial construc-
tion that an intent to discharge the instrument is requisite to a dis-
charge.328
3= UCC § 3-601(2).
-In Ginnett v. Greene, 87 Wash. 40, 151 Pac. 99 (1915) there is a dictum that
a novation must be in writing as if it were a renunciation. See the cases cited in
note 320 supra.
"= See BRIrrON, BILLS AND NOTES 653 (2d ed. 1961). The requirement of a
writing appears also in UCC § 1-107, again dealing with relinquishment of claims
without consideration.
", Fisher v. Woodruff, 25 Wash. 67, 64 Pac. 923 (1901).
" National Ass'n of Creditors, Inc. v. Menish, 144 Wash. 150, 257 Pac. 241
(1927).
3" UCC § 3-606. For relevant pre-Code Washington decisions see North Pac.
Mortgage Co. v. Krewson, 129 Wash. 239, 224 Pac. 566 (1924), 53 A.L.R. 1416;
Davis v. Gutheil, 87 Wash. 596, 152 Pac. 14 (1915), 16 COLUm. L. Rv. 80 (1916),
" As was true in pre-Code law. Gleason v. Brown, 129 Wash. 196, 224 Pac. 930
(1924).
' American Cement Corp. v. Century Transit Mix, Inc., 3 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1966).
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Section 3-606. Impairment of Recourse or of Collateral.
(1) The holder discharges any party to the instrument to the extent
that without such party's consent the holder
'(a) without express reservation of rights releases or agrees not to
sue any person against whom the party has to the knowledge
of the holder a right of recourse or agrees to suspend the
right to enforce against such person the instrument or collat-
eral or otherwise discharges such person, except that failure
or delay in effecting any required presentment, protest or
notice of dishonor with respect to any such person does not
discharge any party as to whom presentment, protest or
notice of dishonor is effective or unnecessary; or
(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instrument given
by or on behalf of the party or any person against whom he
has a right of recourse.
(2) By express reservation of rights against a party with a right of
recourse the holder preserves
(a) all his rights against such party as of the time when the
instrument was originally due; and
(b) the right of the party to pay the instrument as of that time;
and
(c) all rights of such party to recourse against others.
At many points in the discussion of the impact of article 3 on
Washington law reference has been made to the uncertain results
following from the interaction of suretyship and bills and notes prin-
ciples. This particular section is the most significant one in which
this interrelationship is dealt with. Herein are detailed the various
suretyship defenses which can be expected to arise in a bills and notes
situation.
The major change worked by this Code section will, so far as
Washington is concerned, lie in the basic assumption that the true
relationship of the parties, rather than the relationship established
on the instrument, determines the availability vel non of suretyship
defenses. Under the NIL, the effect of extensions of time of payment
was dependent on the position occupied by the parties on the instru-
ment. Thus, an accommodation maker (who appeared on the paper
as the principal debtor, but who was really a surety because of the
1968]
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accommodation nature of his signing) was held not to be discharged
by a binding extension of time granted to a payee-indorser who was
the party accommodated.329 The rule will be otherwise under the
Code. If a holder knows that the maker is an accommodation maker
having a right of recourse against the accommodated payee, the hol-
der's grant of an extension of time to the payee will be covered by
this Code section. It will, thus, discharge the accommodation maker,
unless he consents33 ° or unless rights against him are reserved. 331
Indorsers and drawers, whether for accommodation or not, will be
discharged by extensions granted to makers or acceptors.332
The NIL's statement of the rule regarding the effect of extensions
of time was, perhaps, more accurate than is the Code's in one respect.
The extension granted must be a binding one,333 and the NIL expressly
so provided.3 4 The Code is not specific on the point, 35 but it is
"Dove v. Cowlitz Valley Bank, 191 Wash. 429, 71 P.2d 555 (1937) ; Continental
Mut. Say. Bank v. Elliott, 166 Wash. 283, 6 P.2d 638 (1932) ; Bradley Eng'r & Mfg.
Co. v. Heyburn, 56 Wash. 628, 106 Pac. 170 (1910) ; First Nat'l Bank v. Fowler, 54
Wash. 65, 102 Pac. 1038 (1909). The law in Washington prior to enactment of the
NIL is, however, consistent with the rule under the Code. McDougall v. Walling, 21
Wash. 478, 58 Pac. 669 (1899); McDougall v. Walling, 19 Wash. 80, 52 Pac. 530(1898); McDougall v. Walling, 15 Wash. 78, 45 Pac. 668 (1896); cf. Culbertson v.
Wilcox, 11 Wash. 522, 39 Pac. 954 (1895). The community property law concept
may affect this rule, as in McKee v. Whitworth, 15 Wash. 536, 46 Pac. 1045 (1896).
' Obviously a consenting surety is not discharged. Yakima Hardware Co. v. Strick-
ler, 156 Wash. 369, 286 Pac. 853 (1930) ; McDougall v. Walling, 15 Wash. 78, 45 Pac.
668 (1896).
" The Code retains the rule continuing the surety's liability if there is an
express reservation of rights. Earlier decisions are in accord: Moore v. Dark,
52 Wn. 2d 555, 327 P.2d 429 (1958); Davis v. Gutheil, 87 Wash. 596, 152 Pac. 14(1915), 16 COLUm. L. REV. 80 (1916); Merchants' Bank v. Bussell, 16 Wash. 546, 48
Pac. 242 (1897) ; Bank of B.C. v. Jeffs, 15 Wash. 230, 46 Pac. 247 (1897) ; Boston
Nat'l Bank v. Jose, 10 Wash. 185, 38 Pac. 1026 (1894).
"'Yakima Hardware Co. v. Strickler, 164 Wash. 155, 2 P.2d 90 (1931). This is
derived from the general suretyship principal. Nelson v. Flagg, 18 Wash. 39, 50
Pac. 571 (1897) ; Binnian v. Jennings, 14 Wash. 677, 45 Pac. 302 (1896) ; Warburton
v. Ralph, 9 Wash. 537, 38 Pac. 140 (1894).
There will always be the possibility of factual disputes, such as whether the ex-
tension was actually granted after the surety became liable, Rattelmiller v. Stone,
28 Wash. 104, 68 Pac. 168 (1902), or whether an extension had in fact been granted,
Boston Nat'l Bank v. Jose, 10 Wash. 185, 38 Pac. 1026 (1894).
Note the specific provision of UCC § 4-108 which, in effect, permits banks to
extend the time of payment.
Thus, an extension which is contrary to public policy has been held ineffective
so a surety is not discharged thereby. Boyd v. Cochrane, 18 Wash. 281, 51 Pac. 383(1897). Usually, the reason for argument about the binding effect of a particular ex-
tension involves the presence or absence of consideration, as in Van de Ven v.
Overlook Mining & Dev. Co., 146 Wash. 332, 262 Pac. 981 (1928); Price v. Mitchell,
23 Wash. 742, 63 Pac. 514 (1901) ; Bank of B.C. v. Jeffs, 18 Wash. 135, 51 Pac. 348(1897) ; Stayer & Walker v. Missimer, 6 Wash. 173, 32 Pac. 995 (1893).M NIL § 120(6) [WASH. REV. CODE §62.01.120(6) (1955)].
Penny, A Summary of Articles 3 and 4 and Their Impact in New York, 48
CORNELL L.Q. 47, 72 (1962).
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highly doubtful that any change in the controlling principle was
intended.
The Code's treatment of releases or other forms of discharge granted
by a holder to a principal debtor follows traditional lines,38 but
agreements or covenants not to sue may be differently treated. In
suretyship theory, an agreement not to sue or covenant not to sue
was thought of as a release with reservation of rights, not discharging
the surety.337 The Code, however, seems to equate agreements not to
sue with releases and to require, in all cases, an express reservation of
rights -against persons having a right of recourse from the party
released. 338
Impairment of collateral, the final suretyship defense -treated, is
given the same effect as is given by usual suretyship law. 39
The surety has certain other rights not expressly covered by this
section of the Code. If he pays, he has a right to reimbursement from
the principal debtor. The Code gives this right by section 3-603 (2).
He may compel the principal debtor to exonerate him. There is no
specific Code provision on this, but the right may be preserved by
section 1-103. The surety has a statutory right, in Washington, to
compel the creditor to proceed first against the principal debtor.34
An indorser, as such, does not have this right.341 It may be argued,
however, that a surety who signs as indorser should have the protection
of these statutes 42
' The discharge of a principal, by the voluntary act of the creditor, will release
the guarantor. Keane v. Fidelity Say. & Loan Ass'n, 173 Wash. 199, 22 P.2d 59
(1933). This resultant discharge flows from the affirmative act of the releasor. A
surety is not discharged if the principal is discharged by operation of law, as by
delay in presenting a claim against the principal's estate. Donnerberg v. Oppen-
heimer, 15 Wash. 290, 46 Pac. 254 (1896).
The effect of the release of one of several co-makers will be governed by UCC
§ 3-606(2). See North Pac. Mortgage Co. v. Krewson, 129 Wash. 239, 224 Pac. 566(1924).
BUTTON, BILLS AND NOTES 682 (2d ed. 1961).
Penney, supra note 335.
'In the Washington cases, the rulings denying the discharge to one who appears
as maker must be ignored. Otherwise, the rulings are consistent with the Code's
rule. See Seattle Discount Corp. v. Hollywood Inv. Co., 184 Wash. 14, 49 P.2d 475
(1935); Northern Bank & Trust Co. v. Slater, Watt & Co., 123 Wash. 528, 212
Pac. 1063 (1923); Bradley Eng. & Mfg. Co. v. Heyburn, 56 Wash. 628, 106 Pac.
170 (1910). It has generally been held that a bank which holds a note is not re-
quired to offset against it sums on deposit Kirkland Land & Improvement Co. v.
Jones, 18 Wash. 407, 51 Pac. 1043 (1898); Bank of B.C. v. Jeffs, 15 Wash. 230, 46
Pac. 247 (1896).
sWAsu. Rav. CODE §§ 19.72.100, .101; .140, and .141 (1965).
'Allen v. Chambers, 13 Wash. 327, 43 Pac. 57 (1895).
1 BRITTON, BILLs AND NoTS § 301 (2d ed. 1961).
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PART 7. ADVICE OF INTERNATIONAL SIGHT DRAFT
Section 3-701. Letter of Advice of International Sight Draft.
(1) A "letter of advice" is a drawer's communication to the drawee
that a described draft has been drawn.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed when a bank receives from another
bank a letter of advice of an international sight draft the
drawee bank may immediately debit the drawer's account and
stop the running of interest pro tanto. Such a debit and any
resulting credit to any account covering outstanding drafts
leaves in the drawer full power to stop payment or otherwise
dispose of the amount and creates no trust or interest in favor
of the holder.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed and except where a draft is drawn
under a credit issued by the drawee, the drawee of an inter-
national sight draft owes the drawer no duty to pay an unad-
vised draft but if it does so and the draft is genuine, may
appropriately debit the drawer's account.
This section of the Code has no previous statutory counterpart,
and no Washington decision relevant to the section has been discovered.
PART 8. MISCELLANEOUS
Section 3-801. Drafts in a Set.
(1) Where a draft is drawn in a set of parts, each of which is
numbered and expressed to be an order only if no other part
has been honored, the whole of the parts constitutes one draft
but a taker of any part may become a holder in due course of
the draft.
(2) Any person who negotiates, indorses or accepts a single part
of a draft drawn in a set thereby becomes liable to any holder
in due course of that part as if it were the whole set, but as
between different holders in due course to whom different parts
have been negotiated the holder whose title first accrues has
all rights to the draft and its proceeds.
(3) As against the drawee the first presented part of a draft drawn
in a set is the part entitled to payment, or if a time draft to
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acceptance and payment. Acceptance of any subsequently
presented part renders the drawee liable thereon under sub-
section (2). With respect both to a holder and to the drawer
payment of a subsequently presented part of a draft payable
at sight has the same effect as payment of a check notwith-
standing an effective stop order (Section 4-407).
(4) Except as otherwise provided in this section, where any part
of a draft in a set is discharged by payment or otherwise the
whole draft is discharged.
The Washington statutory enactments prior to the Code 43 were
the provisions of the NIL. The Official Comments explain the depar-
tures the Code makes from those statutes.
Section 3-802. Effect of Instrument on Obligation for Which
It is Given.
(1) Unless otherwise agreed where an instrument is taken for an
underlying obligation
(a) the obligation is pro tanto discharged if a bank is drawer,
maker or acceptor of the instrument and there is no recourse
on the instrument against the underlying obligor; and
(b) in any other case the obligation is suspended pro tanto until
the instrument is due or if it is payable on demand until its
presentment. If the instrument is dishonored action may be
maintained on either the instrument or the obligation; dis-
charge of the underlying obligor on the instrument also
discharges him on the obligation.
(2) The taking in good faith of a check which is not postdated does
not of itself so extend the time on the original obligation as to
discharge a surety.
A variety of factual patterns has posed the issue whether a check
or other instrument is in "payment" of a particular obligation. The
word "obligation" in this context (and it is believed as it is used in
the Code section) does not necessarily mean "debt." One may "pay"
the "price" of goods or services by using a negotiable instrument-the
price being the underlying obligation in the particular transaction.
The decisions are virtually impossible to reconcile or structure, for
two reasons: First, the intention of the parties is the dominant factor,
11 WASir. REv. CoDE §§ 62.01.178-.183 (1965).
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and this is a question of fact.Y Second, the context in which the
question is posed may produce considerations more significant than
the abstract logical proposition that a check or note is or is not
payment.
For example, in Berliner v. Greenberg345 one partner, in an effort
to reach a settlement, had delivered a check payable to the other
partner. The payee indorsed the check, but he did not cash it. This
was held not to be an accord and satisfaction, no doubt indisputably
on the facts because the drawer had stopped payment. The theory
expressed was that the accord and satisfaction are accomplished on
cashing the check.
Compare with this the decision in Maryatt v. Hubbard34 where
a buyer of real property (a greenhouse) drew her check payable to
the seller. The seller retained the check for some time, but the check
was not cashed. The issue was whether payment had been accom-
plished for purposes of the Statute of Frauds. The holding was that
payment had been made for this purpose. Obviously, a different time
was selected for the critical event of payment in this case from the
one selected in Berliner, but the outcome in each case was the desirable
one.
A third case in the sequence might well be Engstrom v. Benzel,3 47
in which a seller of goods in a "cash sale" accepted a check in payment.
After several weeks' delay, the check was eventually cashed, and the
buyer's trustee in bankruptcy argued that this late "payment" con-
stituted a preferential transfer. There was no preference, said the
Court, because the check was only "conditional payment" and title
to the goods passed only at the time the check was actually paid in cash.
This last case seems to illustrate the basic enigma-we habitually
think of checks (as distinguished from notes) as the medium of
payment, not as the means of evidencing debt. Yet an unpaid check
really represents only an obligation to pay. For some purposes this
obligation is good enough to equate to payment, but unless a bird in
the bush is worth one in the hand, the check is scarcely the same
payment as dollars would be.
Frequently, a conditional buyer will "pay" the down payment by
giving his note. Thereafter, for good cause, the seller will rescind the
." Vancouver Nat'l Bank v. Katz, 142 Wash. 306, 252 Pac. 934 (1927).
'-37 Wn. 2d 308, 223 P.2d 598 (1950).
'"33 Wn. 2d 325, 205 P.2d 623 (1949), 8 A.L.R.2d 245.
347 191 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1951).
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contract, with the consequence that (a) unpaid portions of the price
are not recoverable and (b) portions of the price already paid are
forfeited. 4 What about the note given for the down payment? The
very fact that a suit will be needed to enforce it clearly suggests that
the down payment was not "paid" in any lay sense. Yet ought the
conditional buyer be better off by his having given a note than he
would have been had he actually paid (and thus lost) the down
payment? The Washington decisions have usually enforced the note,
on the theory that it was payment and not an unperformed obligation
under the conditional sales contract.3 49 Thus the obligor must pay
his note.
The presently discussed section of the Code has only oblique sig-
nificance in these cases. It could be argued, for example, that the
giving of a check on which the obligor is the drawer is not payment
within the Statute of Frauds, and thus Maryatt v. Hubbard350 is no
longer valid. A contrary holding is expectable, however, because the
Code provision relates only to the enforceability of the underlying
obligation while the check is outstanding. It does not identify the
event which constitutes payment for purposes of the Statute of
Frauds.351
Insofar as the enforceability of the underlying obligation is disposed
of by the Code, the Washington decisions seem entirely consistent
with the rule adopted. Subparagraph (1) (a) has a counterpart in
Scott v. Seaboard Sec. Co.35 2 In that case, a conditional seller ac-
cepted a cashier's check payable to his own order in payment of the
balance of the price. Although the seller never received dollars, he was
held to have been paid. The reason he did not receive dollars was
that payment had been stopped, but the .court concluded that payment
may not be stopped on such an instrument. The Code would produce
the same result.3 5
3
' The rule here announced seems to govern real property security transactions
and pre-Code personal property security transactions.
"Zackovich v. Jasmont, 32 Wn. 2d 73, 200 P.2d 742 (1948); Van Geest v.
Willard, 27 Wn. 2d 753, 180 P.2d 78 (1947); McHugh v. Rosaia, 184 Wash. 463,
51 P2d 616 (1935); Vickerman v. Kapp, 167 Wash. 464, 9 P2d 793 (1932). How-
ever, in Hartmeier v. Eiseman, 34 Wn. 2d 225, 208 P.2d 918 (1949), the court held
that a question of fact is presented whether a check was given in payment.
33 Wn. 2d 325, 205 P.2d 623 (1949).
' Cf. Kensil v. City of Ocean City, 89 N.J. Super. 342, 215 A.2d 43 (1945) (deci-
sion obviates the Code rule by treating it as overly technical as applied to the particu-
lar case).
-143 Wash. 514, 255 Pac. 660 (1927). Cf. UCC § 4-211; Reconstruction Fin.
Corp. v. Lyon, 179 Wash. 673, 38 P.2d 1029 (1934).
'Ruskin v. Central Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 3 UCC RPs. SERv. 151 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Queens County, 1966).
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Attention must be paid to another statute which provides: 354
The taking of a promissory note or other evidence of indebtedness
for any labor performed, material furnished, or equipment supplied for
which lien is created by law, shall not discharge the lien therefor, unless
expressly received as payment and so specified herein.
Suppose a landowner were to deliver a cashier's check to a contractor,
but because of later insolvency of the bank that cashier's check was
not paid? Does the lien survive? Under the Uniform Commercial
Code's provision, standing alone, it would appear that the lien would
not survive, for the underlying debt or obligation would have been
pro tanto discharged (to the amount of the check). On the other
hand, the lien survives if the specific lien statute is applicable. Until
we are told, however, what is meant by "or other evidence of indebted-
ness," we cannot be certain whether the lien statute does apply. It
would seem that the cashier's check is not "evidence of indebtedness"
as a note is, and thus the doctrine of ejusdem generis would make the
lien statute inapplicable.
Paragraph (1) (b) has its counterpart in Washington decisions deal-
ing with renewal notes. The outcome of the cases is consistent with
the Code's approach, because if the renewal note is not paid, the
original obligation is enforceable. 315  As a general proposition, giving
a note does not change the nature of the original obligation.356 There
may, however, be situations in which a person's rights on the instru-
ment may be different from those on the underlying obligation. For
example, a surety who guarantees payment of salary may not guarant-
tee payment of the salary check to a holder who has received the
check from the payee.357 The determining factor seems to be whether
or not the underlying guaranteed obligation was assigned to the holder
of the check.
The instrument and the underlying obligation are, however, enough
connected that a discharge on the instrument discharges the obligation.
Delay in handling the instrument, thus, may work a forfeiture of the
'* WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.140 (1959). See Llewellyn Iron Works v. Littlefield.
74 Wash. 86, 132 Pac. 867 (1913).
'Dove v. Cowlitz Valley Bank, 191 Wash. 429, 71 P.2d 555 (1937) ; Vancouver
Nat'l Bank v. Katz, 142 Wash. 306, 252 Pac. 934 (1927) ; Exchange Nat'l Bank v.
Hunt, 75 Wash. 513, 135 Pac. 224 (1913).
'Tucker v. Brown, 20 Wn. 2d 740, 150 P.2d 604 (1944) ; Lally v. Anderson, 194
Wash. 536, 78 P.2d 603 (1938).
17 National Mkt. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 100 Wash. 370, 170 Pac. 1009, 174 Pac.
479 (1918), 1 A.L.R. 450.
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capacity to recover either on the instrument or on the underlying
indebtedness.858
Probably the most significant words in all of subparagraph(1) are
the first three: "Unless otherwise agreed." These words permit factual
inquiries in every case, and further they permit emphasis on particular
facts at the expense of others. The "rule of law" announced by the
Code thus reverts to a construction of the facts to ascertain the inten-
tion of the parties.
There is no counterpart of subsection (2) in Washington decisional
or statutory law prior to the Code's adoption.
Section 3-803. Notice to Third Party.
Where a defendant is sued for breach of an obligation for which
a third person is answerable over under this Article he may give the
third person written notice of the litigation, and the person notified
may then give similar notice to any other person who is answerable
over to him under this Article. If the notice states that the person
notified may come in and defend and that if the person notified does
not do so he will in any action against him by the person giving the
notice be bound by any determination of fact common to the two
litigations, then unless after seasonable receipt of the notice the
person notified does come in and defend he is so bound.
The Washington court has, in the only relevant decision discovered,
announced a rule contrary to that of the Code section. 50 The signifi-
cance of the Code's rule is illustrated by the case in which the Washing-
ton rule was announced, because a series of cases in federal and state
courts was necessary, and the ultimate outcome reached was incon-
sistent.360
Section 3-804. Lost, Destroyed or Stolen Instruments.
The owner of an instrument which is lost, whether by destruc-
tion, theft or otherwise, may maintain an action in his own name
and recover from any party liable thereon upon due proof of his
ownership, the facts which prevent his production of the instrument
and its terms. The court may require security indemnifying the
defendant against loss by reason of further claims on the instrument.
I Goodwin v. Bear, 122 Wash. 49, 209 Pac. 1080 (1922) (extends the rule beyond
that required by the Code). See UCC § 3-501.
1 National Bank of Commerce v. Seattle Nat1 Bank, 109 Wash. 312, 187 Pac. 342
(1920).
' See the discussion in connection with UCC § 3-405.
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Though there is no particular Washington decision on the point,
the rule was settled elsewhere that the owner of a lost instrument
could sue thereon. 61 In such a suit, under the Code as it appears in
Washington, the trial court has discretion in demanding an indemnity
bond. In some states, the courts are required to demand security.362
The probabilities are that in most cases a bond will be required even
though on the facts claimed to exist by the plaintiff it would be
impossible for a holder in due course to enter the picture. Thus, even
though a payee has lost unindorsed paper, if he tries to recover he
will be faced with a demand for posting security. His argument that
no possible harm can come to the payor, inasmuch as there cannot be
another holder of the instrument, will be unavailing.363
Section 3-805. Instruments Not Payable to Order or to Bearer.
This Article applies to any instrument whose terms do not pre-
clude transfer and which is otherwise negotiable within this Article
but which is not payable to order or to bearer, except that there can
be no holder in due course of such an instrument.
The significance of this Code section is stated in the Official Com-
ment and in two important articles.36 4 Probably the greatest import-
ance lies in the impact on the liability of transferors of non-negotiable
paper. If the only obstacle to negotiability is absence of the words
"bearer" or "order," this Code section imposes the warranty and
contract liability of the transferor of negotiable paper upon the trans-
feror of non-negotiable paper. The section would not, however, change
the rule adopted in Virginia Lee Homes, Inc. v. Schneider & Felix
Constr. Co.,65 because there were other obstacles to negotiability.
Nor would the section change the rule adopted in North Am. Bond
& Mortgage Co. v. Twohy.366 In that case, suit was instituted on a
note and a separate guaranty. The note was payable to the payee
or order, but the guaranty described the undertaking as payable only
to the payee. The guarantor was held not to be liable, for a negotiable
"' BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 184 n.17 (2d ed. 1961).
"' Penney, New York Revisits the Code: Some Variations in the New York Enact-
ment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 COLUm. L. REV. 992 (1962).
As in Mar v. Washington Mut. Say. Bank, 64 Wn. 2d 793, 394 P.2d 367 (1964).
' Goodrich, Nonnegotiable Bills and Notes, 5 IOWA L. BvLL. 65 (1920); Willier,
Nronnegotiable Instruments, 11 SYRACUSE L. REV. 13 (1960).
64 Wn. 2d 897, 395 P.2d 99 (1964).
159 Wash. 442, 293 Pac. 717 (1930).
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note is entirely different from a non-negotiable one; thus the guaranty
did not cover the negotiable document. The Code does not, of course,
convert non-negotiable instruments into negotiable instruments. All
it does is to make certain of its statutory edicts applicable both to ne-
gotiable and to certain kinds of non-negotiable paper. The NIL, how-
ever, did not apply in any respect to non-negotiable documents."'
Bleitz v. Bryant Lumber Co., 113 Wash. 455, 194 Pac. 550 (1920). The NIL,
however, was often applied in cases not involving negotiable notes, perhaps by analogy.
See, e.g., Frederick & Nelson v. Spokane Grain Co., 47 Wash. 85, 91 Pac. 570 (1907).
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